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Abstract:  
Technology transfer and commercialization partnerships have become a key focus in knowledge 
based economies. They are deemed a necessary means to translate basic academic research to 
market based solutions. These partnerships can be considered a special group of public-private 
partnerships, as they increasingly include universities as a central player. 
 
The objective of this study is to explore the institutional and behavioural underpinnings of 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships in an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive platform for scholars and practitioners in the area to analyse the various key 
components of these partnerships. To do this, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) Framework presented by Elinor Ostrom (2005) to gain deeper understanding of how 
factors such as community attributes, biophysical and material conditions, and rules impact the 
interactions between participants in technology transfer and commercialization partnerships.  
 
To understand the impact of behavioural factors on the technology transfer partnerships, we then 
make use of two key concepts from the area of behavioural decision making: bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1955) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tverskey, 1979). Based on these theories, 
and on insights from the IAD framework, we develop an understanding of how cognitive 
limitations may influence decisions of individual participants in technology transfer and 
commercialization partnerships. 
 
The theoretical framework is complemented by a case study on Saskatoon’s Agriculture 
Biotechnology Cluster. More specifically, we analyze the initiative to develop the Bio-economy 
Center of Commercialization and Research (BECCR), which was initiated to pool commercially 
viable technologies held across various organizations in the cluster. The study confirms our 
theoretical postulates around institutional and behavioural factors necessary for successful 
development and functioning of these partnerships. The study shows that cognitive framing of 
the issue in the context of win-loss opportunities are key behavioural factors while the broad 
definition of technologies, different organizational cultures, university administrative policies, 
ILO structure, time frames, faculty attitudes and lack of political are found to be the most 
important institutional factors. 
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One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Background 
When US president Barack Obama recently delivered the 2011 state of the union address, 
the message was clear: innovation will determine America’s future. The speech focused on the 
need for effective collaboration between government and the private sector to utilize innovative 
technologies to drive and sustain economic growth. During his speech, President Obama 
emphasized the need for government to take a strategic interest in promoting innovation and 
ensuring that public funding for research gets translated into cutting edge technologies and 
processes which can be used to the benefit of American economy (Obama 2011). 
The message applies not only to the United States but to the wider global community, 
including Canada. It is both reflective of the governments’ concerns for economic growth as well 
as the role of innovation in establishing the leadership position of a country in the global 
community. It brings to attention the changing role of knowledge in economic growth and the 
need to link basic research to economic development. Policy makers have forcefully pointed out 
that for innovation to play a facilitating role in economic growth, basic academic research needs 
to be translated into economically beneficial products and processes. 
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Since the mid-1980s, when the information and bio-technology revolutions swept the 
global economies, innovation has become an integral part of economic policy. There is now a 
heightened recognition that a strong domestic innovation capacity contributes not only to long-
term economic growth and prosperity but also to various other aspects of public policy related to 
education, health, the environment, culture and civil society in general (Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 3). Consequently, focusing on innovation is 
considered to be a central driver for economic and social progress.  
Evolution of national and regional economies into knowledge-based systems has, however, 
introduced a great deal of complexity into the world. Technological advances in fields such as 
biotechnology have created expectations that an increasingly wide range of problems can be 
researched and addressed in a more holistic fashion and at an accelerated pace. This has led to a 
stronger focus on knowledge mobilization and applications, which usually adds to the costs of 
research (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 3). Consequently, it becomes 
very difficult for any single organizational entity to undertake an end-to-end approach 
encompassing research, knowledge mobilization and application. Policy makers, research 
administrators and practitioners have come to recognize that collaborative R&D activities must 
be heightened across organizational, sectoral, and geographic boundaries if they are to compete 
and contribute in a global system (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 4). 
Governments increasingly view enhanced R&D collaboration as a necessary means to achieve 
economies of scale, address productivity gaps, strengthen knowledge mobilization and 
commercialization, and improve the overall well-being of their citizenry (Ibid).  
With the growing importance of knowledge-based economies and an increased focus on 
translating knowledge into the economic realm, universities face new challenges. Universities 
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are now looked upon as providers of both basic and applied research. They are expected to play a 
much larger role in ensuring that their research activities contribute to the social and economic 
development of their communities. The literature on innovation systems has increasingly started 
to ascribe a central position to the universities. Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz (2000), for example, 
have developed the Triple Helix model to explain the interplay between universities and other 
public and private organizations in promoting innovation. They assert that 'entrepreneurial 
universities' feature prominently in government and private sector strategies for innovation. 
Universities have emerged as an important partner in the innovation systems, responsible for 
bringing their research to the market. This requires an increased emphasis on technology transfer 
and commercialization activities; investments in entrepreneurial researchers, technology transfer 
infrastructure, intellectual property, and outreach are key enabling features for partnerships 
between universities and others. 
Together three pillars--academia, the public sector and private firms—comprise the key 
organizational actors in technology transfer partnerships. Each organizational sphere is expected 
to bring different competencies in the production, consumption, and dissemination of knowledge. 
Technology transfer and commercialization partnerships, which are usually a subset of the 
broader collaboration between these sectors, are specifically established to translate knowledge 
from the lab to the marketplace. In this study, we delve into an institutional and behavioural 
analysis of technology transfer partnerships in an attempt to uncover some of the key underlying 
factors that facilitate or hamper the development and functioning of these partnerships. 
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1.2. Study Objectives 
Studying research and technology transfer partnerships between academia, government, 
and private sector is warranted on at least two accounts. First, the infancy of the subject matter 
means there are many interesting issues that have not been comprehensively theorized. The work 
that has been conducted so far remains contextual and fails to provide a comprehensive 
framework that can be applied to multiple situations. None of the past studies have analyzed 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships from an institutional perspective, which 
arguably remains a challenge for scholars of innovation given the complexity of such 
collaborative initiatives. The literature fails to systematically account for individual behaviours 
in these partnerships. Investigating the institutional and behavioural underpinnings of 
partnerships should greatly extend our understanding of these partnerships.  
Second, despite the rhetoric many partnerships have not lived up to their promise of 
delivering measureable economic growth through bringing academic research and technologies 
into the marketplace. With the exception of a few successful cases, the performance of most 
technology transfer collaborations has remained below-par. Much of the attention has focused on 
successful cases which possibly masks important shortcomings in the functioning of technology 
transfer partnerships. 
In this exercise, we undertake an exploratory study of technology transfer partnerships and 
develop a comprehensive analytical framework that involves theoretically grounded institutional 
and behaviour analysis. We utilize Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework (IAD) to carry out the institutional analysis of technology transfer partnerships. 
Further insights into behavioural patterns and cognitive limitations are provided by using the key 
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concepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tverskey, 
1979). Pairing the IAD framework with behavioural theory, unconventional as it may be given 
the nature of our study, allows us to capture both institutional and behavioural underpinnings in a 
comprehensive manner. More important, the framework allows us to develop a common 
‘language’ around partnerships which has been missing in the studies conducted thus far. 
The study uses this framework to undertake an empirical investigation of a specific 
technology transfer partnership. For this part, we explore the attempts to develop a technology 
transfer partnership in the Saskatoon-based agricultural biotechnology cluster. More specifically, 
we delve into a study of a rather unsuccessful attempt between 2006 and 2008, known as the 
Bio-Economy Center of Commercialization and Research (BECCR). This initiative was 
undertaken to pool together commercially viable biotechnologies dispersed across many 
organizations in the cluster. It was hoped that a partnership between various public and quasi-
public organizations in the cluster would enable the private sector to efficiently identify these 
technologies and translate them into the marketplace. The project, however, failed in securing the 
federal funding and consequently no further attempts have been made to develop the idea. 
Despite its failure, the initiative can act as a beta-test case for the theoretical framework and 
provide valuable insights into the institutional and behavioural factors which underlie the 
development of such initiatives. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The study is divided into two components: theoretical and empirical. The theoretical 
component presents the institutional and behavioural analytic framework while the empirical 
component allows us to map the theoretical postulates from the institutional and behavioural 
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framework onto a real scenario. Together these two components are used to develop a deeper 
understanding of technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. 
The theoretical framework is presented in chapters 2-4. Chapter 2 includes a review of the 
literature on technology transfer partnerships. The chapter presents some definitions and 
concepts related to partnerships along with some key factors which have been identified as 
facilitating or hindering their development. Chapter 3 adapts the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework (IAD) to build a set of tools necessary for conducting an institutional 
analysis of technology transfer partnerships. Chapter 4 moves from the broader institutional 
perspective to the individual level to delve into the behavioural factors affecting the decision 
making capacities of individuals within technology transfer partnerships. The chapter challenges 
the rational choice model of decision making and presents some theories on cognitive limitations 
and human behaviour.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 present the empirical work. Chapter 5 presents a case study on the 
Saskatoon Agriculture Biotechnology Cluster, which will allow us to test some of the theoretical 
postulates developed in chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks on 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships.  
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Two 
 
Technology Transfer Partnerships:  
An Overview 
 
 
Since turn of the millennium, policy makers and political leaders have turned their 
attention to innovation-based economic growth. Economic growth is now considered to depend 
upon a strong knowledge-based system, which rely heavily on production and dissemination of 
knowledge across institutional boundaries and into use. Recent experience suggests that 
producing more knowledge does not always translate into economic outcomes in the form of job 
creation, revenues for firms and economic growth in general.  
An increasing reliance on knowledge to spur economic growth in turn brings into focus 
those institutions and actors which only a few decades ago were considered to be on the fringes 
of economic activity. With the inclusion of such actors, the concept of innovation system has 
come to be understood as an “exchange, between actors belonging to different social systems...” 
(Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001, 793). 
These exchanges can be formalized through sales, licenses, contracts, start-ups and, 
increasingly, partnerships. Partnerships usually involve individuals and organizations from both 
the public and private domains; hence some analysts term these as Public-Private Partnerships 
(P3s or PPP). However, these partnerships do not necessarily have to be an amalgamation of 
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public and private spheres; in many instances they are only between public-public or private-
private institutions.  
2.1. Research and Technology Transfer Partnerships 
The advent of biotechnology along with advances in human genome sequencing and 
information technology has transformed the face of technology and science in general. Since the 
20th century science is perceived as the foundation for economic progress within any nation state 
or across the global boundaries (Bush 1945). The rapid growth of knowledge-based economies 
underscores the importance of promoting both basic research and incorporating that research 
through knowledge transfer from the universities into communities, governments, and businesses 
(Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 1). After the Second World War, 
science and academic knowledge were positioned as the driving forces behind industrial 
development and innovation. This move to direct research to practical problems and to translate 
that research into use gained momentum after the United States adopted the Bayh-Dole Act in 
1980, which added commercialization as a mission for publicly funded researchers. Other 
countries, including Canada, have followed the suit by adopting various strategies to bring 
academic knowledge to the marketplace.  
Universities have been assigned a role within the economic development discourse which 
had never existed before the biotech and info-tech revolutions. Increasingly, scholars of 
innovation and technology transfer have started to focus on the university as a key player in the 
nexus of innovation (e.g. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1999, 2000). One of the reasons for the 
more central role ascribed to universities and other science-based institutions, is the gradual 
distancing of governments from providing funding for the production of scientific knowledge. 
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Universities have increasingly looked to private sector sources to leverage funds for their 
research enterprise. At the same time, publicly funded universities are increasingly seen as being 
responsible to the public for ensuring that the funds spent on producing scientific knowledge are 
ultimately translated into economic growth. Universities are now thought to have a central role, 
as part of their public responsibility, to aid economic growth within a region. However, that is 
not to suggest that government or the private sector do not have their own roles to play. Without 
support from national and regional governments, universities cannot maintain healthy and 
vibrant research efforts while the private sector is commonly held to be responsible for providing 
markets for technology being generated in the universities and elsewhere. Therefore, 
collaboration between these three domains is considered necessary not only for creating 
scientific knowledge but also for transforming that knowledge into economically and socially 
valuable uses. 
 Due to intense pressures imposed by governments, universities feel forced to look for 
ways to collaborate with the private sector in order to promote economic growth through 
knowledge production and transformation.  Universities are expected to provide the key inputs to 
innovation and to bring scientific innovations to the marketplace. As a result, a new landscape of 
public-private partnerships has emerged. As mentioned earlier, the concept of public-private 
partnerships varies depending on the underlying dynamics by which actors and institutions 
participate in the process. This can lead to a blurring of organizational mandates in place of 
clearly defined boundaries. Partnerships can require actors from one sector to adopt 
characteristics and points of view of actors from the other.  Many scholars point to the apparent 
shift in universities from basic to applied research as a result of their interaction with the 
industry. Meanwhile, as academics and private sector managers shift their positions within their 
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respective organizations, attitudes, norms and practices diffuse in the system. Coming to terms 
with the new reality of research partnerships is a challenging task which requires a more detailed 
analysis to understand the full effect of public-private partnership. 
2.1.1. Defining Technology Transfer Partnerships 
The technology transfer or research partnership shares many elements with the classical 
public-private partnership model. While the concept of P3s is traditionally applied to a 
collaboration of some sorts between the public and private sectors as well as the non-profit sector 
in the fields of public infrastructure projects, research partnerships involve an amalgamation of 
actors and institutions from both the public and private sectors coming together to  translate  
scholarly scientific research into application and use. The primary purpose of such partnerships 
is to convert scientific innovations generated within academia into commercially-viable products 
and processes for the markets and economy. Perkmann and Kathryn (2007) suggest that research 
partnerships are those collaborative arrangements whose primary objective is to achieve 
cooperation between academia, public sector organizations, and the private sector on research 
and development activities. Research partnerships therefore represent a distinct type of P3s. The 
objective function of these partnerships may be different from that of classical P3s instituted for 
infrastructure projects, where the main task is to replace public management with market norms 
and processes. Many authors suggest that finding a common space, a set of shared organizational 
ideologies, and trust are the key ingredients for the research P3 to work. Perceptions (or 
misperceptions in the case of failed partnerships) and incentives offered to key participants in a 
research partnership determine the level of success achieved by a partnership.  
According to Hall (2006), the concept of public-private partnerships in the context of 
technology transfer generally involves a set of actors engaged in a multitude of activities 
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including production, diffusion, adaptation, adoption, and use of knowledge which are brought 
together to combine existing and new knowledge into a set of marketable technologies, products 
and services. The system emerging from these interactions between actors from various domains 
is thought to be governed by the habits, routines, and practices of actors from each of the 
organizations involved in the process. These interactions often lead to not only product 
innovations but also process innovations, which are then disseminated across organizational 
boundaries and into the economy. Such an innovation process leads to interactive learning 
embedded in an evolving set of relationships and institutional contexts. The evolution of 
relationships and institutions highlights the fact that knowledge production and diffusion across 
organizational boundaries are key drivers of economic growth. The key to successful ventures is 
mobilizing the diversity of stakeholders and institutional rules and norms of the core actors (Hall 
2006, 7).  
It should be noted here that collaborations between public and private organizations, 
including academia, rely both on codified scientific knowledge from within the academy and 
tacit knowledge from other sources (Hall 2006, 7). Codified knowledge emerging from the 
university might be scientific facts about a particular innovation or invention, but may also 
encapsulate knowledge emerging from other organizations or departments within a particular 
organization, for example, knowledge of marketing and business plans generated in a business 
school within a university. Reliance on knowledge of various forms generated in various 
contexts underlines the fact that while technical innovations are important, so are process, 
managerial, institutional and policy innovations (Hall 2006, 8). Innovation thus requires 
accessing knowledge from a number of different types of knowledge bases. Gaining access to 
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different types of knowledge bases often involves partnering and other forms of alliances and 
networking.  
In such an environment, knowledge sharing and access is governed by formal agreements 
and informal institutions, trust, traditions and routines of those involved. Chapter 3 examines this 
further.  
2.2. Models of Technology Transfer and Commercialization 
Most of the literature on innovation, specifically technology transfer and 
commercialization, has focused on context-specific situations. Very few attempts have been 
made to formalize a framework or a model of innovation that can successfully explain the 
technology transfer and commercialization process.  
Two sets of divergent approaches bound the field. Bozeman’s (2000) ‘Contingent 
Effectiveness Model of Technology Transfer’ puts forward a paradigm of  technology transfer 
which takes into account the characteristics of the transfer agent, transfer media, transfer object, 
demand environment and transfer recipient. While the model is useful in understanding the role 
of each of these factors in determining the success of technology transfer from university-
industry collaborations, it is quite a static approach. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000), on the 
other hand, have put forward the Triple Helix Model of Innovation which takes into account the 
dynamic nature of interactions not only between the actors but also between participating 
organizations. In this model, the interactions between the three helices (university-private-public) 
lead to a transformation of each of the participating organizations and their actors. These 
transformations are stored in a new supra-structural layer which shapes further developments in 
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an innovation system. The Triple Helix allows the analyst to track not only bi-directional 
interactions but also multiple interactions stored in the new overlay.  
2.2.1. Contingent Effectiveness Model of Technology Transfer 
Bozeman's model suggests that technology transfer can best be understood in terms of who 
is doing the transfer, how they are doing it, what is being transferred and to whom (Bozeman 
2000, 637). In an attempt to provide a comprehensive understanding of the underlying factors 
which explain the technology transfer process, Bozeman outlines three competing paradigms 
prevalent in the technology transfer world. These paradigms extend an understanding of the role 
assigned to the three pillars (university, public sector and private sector) under different 
ideological and structural constructs. The market failure paradigm assumes that the primary role 
of universities is not that of a broker of technology or a commercial competitor but as an 
educator and a provider of public domain research. The university is, therefore, viewed as the 
primary source of basic research under this paradigm. In the mission paradigm, the government 
takes on the role, both directly (through agencies and public labs) and indirectly (through grants 
to universities), of marshalling resources in order to influence collaborations in such a way as to 
foster technology development. The cooperative technology paradigm presents a hybrid of the 
market failure and mission paradigms in that both the university and government play an active 
role in technology development and transfer. The cooperative paradigm is presented as an 
overarching system whereby a set of values focusing on cooperation among sectors is advanced. 
In this regard, the government takes on the coordinating role between the university and the 
private sector, which can augment productivity and innovation (Bozeman 2000, 631-633).  
Bozeman's model identifies five core dimensions: the transfer agent; the transfer media; the 
transfer object; the demand environment; and the transfer recipient. Characteristics of the 
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transfer agent can be broadly described by the institutional norms, culture and history of the 
organization involved in technology transfer (Bozeman 2000, 637). In this context, norms of 
academia are crucial to understanding the performance of technology transfer activities. In 
addition, the scope and nature of research activity undertaken by the university as well as the 
commercial orientation of academics could explain the market impact of technology being 
commercialized. Other characteristics of the transfer agent that Bozeman deem important for 
successful technology transfer and commercialization include geographic location, degree of 
budgetary and managerial flexibility of the projects, the commitment and interaction of the 
collaborating partners, and the laboratory researcher's familiarity with the firm's needs (Bozeman 
2000, 639). These factors, as argued by Bozeman, provide a fundamental understanding of the 
effectiveness of the technology transfer paradigm.  
 Transfer media can be understood as the underlying intellectual property policies that are 
in place at the participating organizations. These policies, as explained earlier, can provide a 
crucial impetus to transferring a technology from a university laboratory to the private firm. At 
the same time, however, the very same policies, if not drafted carefully, can hinder the transfer 
process and result in a failed commercialization attempt. Human capital and training is a 
fundamental component of the transfer medium. With the increasing complexity of technologies 
that are produced in academic research labs, providing “know-how” or “tacit knowledge” to the 
firms by academics can play a key role in successfully commercializing any given technology 
(Bozeman 2000, 640). It is in this context that the characteristics of the transfer object need to be 
understood. Much of the performance of commercialization process and collaboration between 
academia, public and private sector can be explained by analyzing the nature of the product 
being transferred. Knowledge of product life-cycles, development stages of the technology, and 
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its adaptability can shed significant light on the effectiveness of the transfer process. Bozeman 
and many others have argued that much depends on the form (basic research or applied research) 
and mode (codified, tacit, or explicit knowledge) of a transfer (Bozeman 2000, 642-643).  
 Understanding the demand environment and the characteristics of the transfer recipient 
are important determinants in of effective technology transfer. Bozeman has argued that the 
usual understanding of the demand environment comes from a market-push or a market-pull 
mentality. However, that may not necessarily be true, as non-market forces often shape demand. 
In this context, flexibility and critical mass may play a pivotal role in successful 
commercialization of technology. In addition, the organizational nature of the recipient also 
determines how a particular technology will be received and subsequently commercialized. The 
demands and necessities of a firm decide the fate of technologies being produced in the 
university. Some firms simply want the disembodied technology, product or service; others may 
be more interested in the technical expertise, resources and knowledge found in the institutions 
than in the discrete products or licenses themselves (Bozeman 2000, 643-644).  
2.2.2. The Triple Helix Model of Innovation 
The Triple Helix model is an attempt to capture the dynamics of a complex set of 
interactions between the three key pillars of an innovation system, namely the university, the 
public sector and private firms. The model is analogous to DNA, except with a third helix. It 
adds an extra dimension to the traditional public-private domain by incorporating academia as a 
key strand. Unlike other models explaining the innovation process, the Triple Helix allows for 
dynamic interactions within and across the three participating organizations and their actors. The 
non-linear nature of the model presents the analyst with flexibility to take into consideration 
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reflexive feedbacks which operate both within and across the boundaries of the participating 
organizations. 
In this model, the system of innovation is thought to be continuously in transition, or what 
Etzkowtiz and Leydesdorff (2000, 113) have termed as “endless transition.”  This transitional 
model gives rise to an overlay of communications and expectations which reshape the 
institutional arrangements among universities, industries and government agencies. 
Reformulation of institutional arrangements among the three participating organizations is 
thought to be a direct consequence of the interactions between the actors from the three spheres, 
whereby actors from each sphere increasingly takes on each other’s roles resulting in a 
transformation of their own characteristics. The Triple Helix attempts to model these dynamic 
interactions and the resulting transformations in institutional arrangements and policy models.  
The Triple Helix presents different possible resolutions of the relations among the 
institutional spheres of university, industry, and government which help generate alternative 
strategies for economic growth and social transformations (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, 
112). The model has evolved through a number of stages, closely following the economic and 
political regimes in place. The three evolutionary stages have been termed as Triple Helix I, II, 
and III. In the Triple Helix I configuration, the nation state oversees academia and industry and is 
actively engaged in directing the relations between them. This configuration of the model could 
be found in the former Soviet Union and in East European countries under the influence of 
communism (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, 111). Triple Helix II presents the next 
evolutionary step. This configuration consists of separate institutional spheres with clearly 
defined borders dividing them and highly circumscribed relations among the spheres. This is 
typified by Scandinavian countries such as Sweden (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, 112). An 
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increased focus on tri-lateral initiatives for knowledge-based economic development, however, 
has transformed the model into what is known as the Triple Helix III configuration, where there 
are overlapping institutional spheres with each taking the role of the other and giving rise to 
hybrid organizations at the interfaces (Ibid). The Triple Helix III configuration forms the 
underlying core of institutional analysis to follow.  
 The Triple Helix model can be thought of as a network of relationships which generate 
reflexive sub-dynamics. These sub-dynamics consist of market forces, political power, 
institutional control, social movements, technological trajectories, and regimes (Ibid). The 
operations on these sub-dynamics can be expected to be nested and interacting in a dynamic 
manner. The interaction between these sub-dynamics across the helices can develop an overlay 
of communications, networks, and organizations. This supra-structural overlay gives rise to a 
comprehensive innovative system encompassing the creation, dissemination, and utilization of 
knowledge.  
2.2.3. Critique of models of innovation and technology transfer 
The Contingent Effectiveness model of Technology Transfer and the Triple Helix model of 
Innovation have clearly helped extend understanding of the innovation process, as well as 
understanding of some of the key underlying factors contributing to the effective production, 
dissemination, and utilization of knowledge. These models present a good starting point for the 
institutional and behavioural analysis in this paper but both models have their shortcomings 
which need to be taken into consideration before applying either to the study of technology 
transfer process and the broader innovation system.  
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The models are situated at opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum in terms of their 
dealing with the complexity of the system. Bozeman’s model falls short of capturing the 
dynamism and hence paints an over-simplistic picture of the technology transfer process. In 
addition, the model extensively focuses on the technical aspects such as the characteristics of the 
transfer object and consequently ends up ignoring the critical institutional and the role of 
individuals whose interactions shape up the system. The Etzkowitz-Leydesdorff model, in 
contrast, represents an extremely complex scenario, with multiple transformations and dynamic 
interactions taking place simultaneously. At root, the triple helix is closest to an institutional 
model, but falls short on two accounts. Firstly, it can be argued that more dynamism and 
complexity is implied in the model than is explained through the proposed theoretical 
framework. Secondly, it does not provide us with the necessary institutional tools to analyze and 
explain the interactions and transformations among the three pillars. The model makes no 
attempt to clarify the underlying institutional grammar that shapes up the interactions among 
variables within these innovation systems. Moreover, while both models allude to organizational 
and behavioural factors, neither examines them in depth. Consequently, they leave out finer 
details which are necessary to understand the functioning of partnerships. 
2.3. Rationale for Technology Transfer Partnerships 
While the key underlying purpose of a research partnership is production, propagation and 
transformation of knowledge, not every partnership may be instituted to achieve all of these 
goals simultaneously. A partnership between university, government, and the private sector may 
be entered into to achieve only one or some of these goals. In addition, each of the organizations 
and actors involved in the collaborative process may have their own motivations to participate. It 
is critical to understand the motivations of each participant organization and their representative 
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actors in order to get a better understanding of the expected role of the research partnership and 
its subsequent level of achievement. In this sense, it could be said that research partnerships are 
context specific and attention must be paid to the underlying goals of each of the partnership. Let 
us now turn our attention to individual organizations and their motivations in entering a research 
partnership with other sectors.  
Governments are inherently interested in promoting university-industry partnerships 
because they are thought to contribute towards economic growth of a region. The development 
of new, high-opportunity technology platforms such as computer science, molecular biology and 
material sciences based on fundamental university research have prompted a greater focus on 
establishing university-industry partnerships with government supporting or regulating these 
partnerships. Such partnerships allow governments to offload some financial responsibilities to 
the private sector and hence can be viewed as a cost saving or sharing strategy. This way 
governments can promote basic research, which universities are more able to conduct compared 
to public laboratories, while at the same time forcing universities to play a more important role in 
economic growth through technology transfer and commercialization activities.  
The reasons a university would want to participate in a research partnership could be two-
fold. Firstly, the faculty may be interested in gaining exposure and future employment for 
graduate students. Research partnerships could present the faculty and university administrators 
with good opportunities to find placements for their graduates in the private sector. These 
partnerships also present an opportunity for the university researchers to bring their research into 
the marketplace and gain recognition for their basic research. In order to achieve this goal, many 
faculty members offer their services to the private sector through consultation in addition to 
direct collaborations with industry to develop products suitable for the market. Through 
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networking with private sector managers and entrepreneurs, academic researchers may also 
engage in learning about the market structures and the demands of the markets. This, in turn, 
may lead to new ideas and enable the researcher to incorporate these ideas into their research 
programs, sometimes generating products more suitable for commercial purposes. These 
partnerships also present faculty with opportunities to leverage private sector funding to expand 
their research programs. Declining financial support from government has in many cases created 
a need to find new financial sources in order to be able to carry on with basic research. Research 
partnerships, in whatever form they may be, can provide the faculty with financial rewards, 
which can then be invested into lab equipment and hiring more students. All these activities 
translate into more research productivity for the faculty involved, allowing them to progress in 
their academic careers.  
 Private sector firms are also interested in partnering with academia and the public sector 
for a variety of reasons. Firstly, collaborating with universities allows firms to make use of state-
of-the-art research equipment, which at times only universities have access to. Firms, especially 
smaller ones, may not have the capacity to conduct in-house R&D and acquiring such capacity 
may not be financially viable. Therefore, firms often turn to universities to gain timely and cost-
effective access to specialized equipment. Secondly, and more importantly, collaborating with 
universities allows firms of all sizes to tap into a vast base of academic knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, and know-how knowledge, which only academic researchers may possess. It has 
been pointed out that larger firms are “less interested in proof of concept or reduced to practice 
stage technologies because of internal rate-of-return requirements on R&D investments” 
(Markman et al. 2005, 252). For such large and resource-rich organizations, access to know-how 
and tacit knowledge is more important. Crossing organizational boundaries and entering into 
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partnerships with academia therefore allows the firms to engage in an interactive learning 
process and help firms to introduce not only technological innovations, but also organizational 
innovations (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2001, 791) These organizational innovations, as argued in 
the innovation literature, are an important component to a firm`s success and survival in the long 
run.  
2.4. Key Elements of Technology Transfer Partnerships 
 A review of literature on research partnerships suggests a variety of elements that may be 
necessary in forming a research alliance between university and the private sector. Generally 
speaking, firm-industry research partnerships rely upon formal and informal interactions which 
are influenced by firm strategy and industry characteristics, university policies, the structure of 
the technology transfer operations and regulatory parameters defined by government policies 
(Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, 177). Many of the elements deemed necessary in a research 
partnership are the ones which are also thought to be crucial in developing a conventional public-
private partnership. For example, presence of a common ideological space and synergies 
between the academic and the private sectors is a key factor needed for a research partnership to 
form. A research partnership ought to enable participating organizations to share risks, build on 
jointly shared capabilities, and create synergies for better competitiveness (Santoro and 
Gopalakrishnan 2001, 163). In addition, the parties to such partnerships ought to collaborate to 
further mutually compatible interests rather than to act opportunistically. Therefore, finding 
complementarities is the first step towards establishing a successful research partnership and 
realizing the proposed goals of that partnership. 
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 Similarly, trust and favourable perceptions of the participating actors are crucial factors 
for the successful development of research partnerships. Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2001) 
argue that trust building serves to promote partnership development on three fronts. Firstly, trust 
building allows collaborating organizations to develop confidence about their partner’s abilities 
and expected behaviour. Secondly, trust leads an organization to cooperate rather than be 
sceptical of the other organization. Finally, trust serves as a social control mechanism that helps 
govern economic transactions (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 2001, 165). In a similar attempt, 
Harmon et al. (1997) have suggested that respect and trust, along with open communication, 
mutual interdependence, and willingness to compromise are factors which can greatly facilitate 
the partnership building process. Open communication is considered important in this regard, as 
it can help in building higher trust levels as well as allowing the partners in searching for 
synergies within the partnership (Harmon et al. 1997, 426). 
 From the administrative point of view, it has been argued that, intellectual property rights 
(IPR) are the key mechanism which can facilitate the exchanges of technology and knowledge 
between academia and private sector. IPRs are considered very crucial in determining private 
sector perceptions about the university they plan to collaborate with. IPRs thus act as 
institutional incentives for the private firms, as they determine the viability and accessibility of a 
certain technology for the private sector. Flexible IPR regimes are considered extremely 
important to get a favourable perception by private sector. Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2001) 
have argued that when universities give up sole ownership of IPRs, patents, and licenses, it 
projects the university as a flexible and motivated partner in the view of private firms. In 
addition, by rewarding potential partners the university demonstrates to the industrial community 
that industry alliances are valued (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan 2001, 166). The literature also 
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suggests that IP ownership is a key signal to the private sector about the availability of certain 
technology and knowledge that is ready to be transferred to the markets. Siegel and Wright 
(2007) argue that a critical mass of IPR in a focused number of areas is an important part of 
developing a university commercialization strategy. IPRs act as a signal to the private sector that 
a university has the necessary skills, capabilities, and willingness to collaborate with the private 
sector to commercialize technology (Siegel and Wright 2007, 535). At the same time, Siegel and 
Wright stress the importance of maintaining a balance between intellectual property (IP) 
ownership and flexibility. It has been suggested that an aggressive IP policy on part of the 
university can spark a competitive rift between the university and the private sector, which could 
impede development of a partnership between the two sectors. Nevertheless, IPRs are a crucial 
determinant of the viability of a research partnership and therefore should be analyzed carefully 
within the context of research partnerships.  
 While in-house IP policies governing the interactions between the two sectors are 
important, spatial theorists have posited that geographic proximity between the university and 
the private sector firms is also an important factor. Santoro and Gopalakrishnan (2001) have 
argued that the greater the geographic proximity between the industrial firm and the university 
research center, the greater the potential for technology transfer. Geographic proximity facilitates 
the natural exchange of ideas between the university and the private sector through both formal 
and informal exchanges. The line of argument suggests that due to the nature of interaction 
between the university and firms, capturing knowledge spill overs is a main concern for the 
private sector firms. Being located within a close proximity to the university allows them to 
capture these spill-overs and the associated benefits at relatively low cost (Santoro and 
Gopalakrishnan 2001, 165).  
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Lidelof and Lofsten (2004) have shown in their work that firms, especially newly formed 
technology based firms (NTBFs), located in close proximity to a university have networking 
advantages which can be a huge value to the newly established firms (Lindelof and Lofsten 
2004, 311). These firms usually lack the scale and scope to conduct in-house research-- 
geographic proximity to the university research center provides them access to the faculty, 
laboratories and employees in the form of graduates. Spatial proximity, therefore, increases the 
competitive advantage of a firm engaged in a research partnership with the university. In 
addition to any benefits of geographic proximity for industrial firms, the university itself can tap 
into complementary assets in firms, such as manufacturing, distribution, and marketing, in order 
to support research, train staff and to commercialize products generated within the university. 
Lindelof and Lofsten (2004, 314) show that organizations established in a close proximity can 
generate high levels of wealth and jobs. 
Another crucial element in developing effective research partnerships between universities 
and private firms is the level of willingness and capabilities of the faculty members to engage in 
the technology transfer process. The literature on technology transfer suggests that faculty 
researchers at academic institutions are a key stakeholder in a research partnership. Bercovitz 
and Feldmann (2006) argue that the role assumed by the individual faculty member is at the heart 
of technology transfer process (Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, 180). A willingness on part of 
these scientists to engage in the partnership process can greatly enhance the effectiveness of a 
research partnership and related commercialization.   
Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (2002) have intensively studied the relationship between the 
presence of “star scientists” and their impact on the research partnerships. The level of 
interaction between star academic scientists and private sector scientists is shown to have a 
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significantly positive impact on the levels of technology transfer and a firm’s innovativeness 
(Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong 2002, 139). The authors argue that self-interested participation 
by key professors is an essential condition for successful commercial licensing of university 
inventions (Ibid). They argue that university scientists bring with them a source of tacit 
knowledge which is essential for the further development, adaption, and commercialization of 
technology and products generated in university laboratories. Therefore, a strong entrepreneurial 
ethos at the individual faculty level is a necessary element in the development of university-
industry research partnerships.  
Different institutional factors affect the motivation of individual faculty members to 
engage in the technology transfer process. It has been argued that an individual faculty member’s 
decision to participate in the technology transfer process is influenced by three factors: training 
effects, leadership effects, and cohort effects (Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, 180). Thursby and 
Thursby (2002) have argued that underlying the motivations of individual faculty members are 
the ideological beliefs of these researchers about the nature and role of their research (Thursby 
2002, 92). University scientists are not just motivated by money—their individual cognitive 
processes influence their interest. The impact of individual cognitive positioning on the 
development and success of research partnerships will be dealt with in the fourth chapter. 
2.5. Typologies of Technology Transfer Partnerships 
The literature highlights many forms of research partnerships, categorized based on their 
function, institutional rules or actors involved. Regardless of the specific form a partnership 
takes, the key element in any research partnership is the production and dissemination of 
knowledge. As mentioned in the previous sections, this could be institutional, know-how, or tacit 
  
knowledge held by a multitude of actors in participating organizations. 
research partnerships may be preferred over others because they guarantee a better diffusion of 
knowledge (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994, 236)
partnership in an order of increasing depth of relationships between the partners and 
of the interactions. According to th
bottom end of the spectrum while cooperative research is most enduring in terms of intensity and 
length of partnership. Technology transfer, followed by knowledge transfer fall in the middle of 
the spectrum (Dooley and Kirk 2007, 319)
knowledge transfer higher than technology transfer in terms of the length and intensity of 
relationship between the two sectors.
based around the relational involvement
Table 2.1. A typology of university
 Source: Perkmann and Walsh 2007, 263
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university would prefer one of these methodologies depe
the authors classify as early-stage inventions, proof of concept, reduction to practice, and 
prototyping. Based on an empirical study conducted in United States, they established a 
correlation between stages of techn
(e.g. sponsored research, equity, and cash) as well as the recipients of these technologies. 
2.1 captures these relationships. 
Figure 2.1. The relationship between technology stage, 
transfer partner 
Source: Markman et al. 2005, 257
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organizations. They argue that “firm-industry interactions combine formal and informal 
interactions and are influenced by firm strategy and industry characteristics, university policies 
as well as the structure of the technology transfer operations and the parameters defined by 
government policy” (Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, 177). These factors in turn influence the 
nature of a specific partnership, which can take the form of sponsored research, licenses, hiring 
of students, and spin-off firms. These basic forms of partnerships are then often complemented 
by activities such as consultation by individual faculty members, participation in research 
consortia, conferences and other informal networking events. These complementary activities 
ensure that the transfer of technology and knowledge is bidirectional— that is, it flows both to 
and from the university and the firm.  
2.6. Role and Structure of Technology Transfer Offices in P3s 
 The technology transfer office has a key role to play in the technology transfer and 
commercialization process. Depending on the structure and mandate instituted for the technology 
transfer office by the university administration, the technology transfer office may engage in a 
series of activities including networking with potential partners, patenting and licensing 
technology, and assisting and actively participating in spin-off creation. This list of activities is 
not exhaustive by any means. The technology transfer office may engage in either one or a 
combination of these and many more activities. In short, the technology transfer office has a 
complex set of tasks that it undertakes at various junctures of technology development, transfer, 
and commercialization. 
Various authors define the role of the technology transfer office as ‘intermediary’, 
‘facilitator’, and ‘guardian’. The TTO may undertake these roles simultaneously or switch 
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between these at different stages of the transfer process. Siegel, Veugelers and Wright (2007) 
argue that the technology transfer’s primary role is that of an intermediary between suppliers of 
innovations (i.e. university scientists) and those who can potentially commercialize them (i.e. 
private sector firms, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists) (Siegel, Veugelers, and Wright 2007, 
641). By acting as an intermediary, the technology transfer office facilitates commercial 
knowledge transfers of IP from the university either through licensing to existing firms or via 
start-up companies (ibid). In this context the technology transfer office also acts to reduce 
institutional and technological uncertainty between the two parties. It fills any voids that exist 
between knowledge generation and transfer, effectively engaging in a balancing act during 
negotiations with private firms (Siegel, Veugelers, and Wright 2007, 643).  
 Another line of argument taken by Siegel et al. (2004) is that technology transfer offices 
view themselves as the guardians of a university’s IP portfolio. In this context, the primary 
motive of the technology transfer office is not only to safeguard the university’s intellectual 
property portfolio but also to market that technology in a way that is most profitable for the 
university (Siegel et al. 2004, 118).  
The effectiveness of a technology transfer office’s activities depends to a certain extent on 
its organizational structure. Debackere and Veugelers (2005) have argued that universities with a 
decentralized technology transfer process, through a dedicated and specialized set of technology 
transfer offices, often deliver the greatest number of successful research partnerships and 
technology commercialization (Debackere and Veugelers 2005, 323). In contrast, if a university 
opts for a professional bureaucracy, marked by traditional faculty and departmental 
organizational boundaries and structures, the university’s commercial orientation is likely to be 
limited. Divisional structures may be used to discern an institution's intent towards commercial 
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exploitation—decentralized approaches and incentive mechanisms are required to engage and to 
involve the researchers and their groups as active partners in the exploitation process (Debackere 
and Veugelers 2005, 324).  
Markman et al. (2005) argue that technology transfer offices can be classified into three 
archetypes: university structures; non-profit 501(C)1 research foundations; and for-profit private 
venture extensions (Markman et al. 2005, 242).1 Non-profit research foundations [501(C)1] 
enjoy more flexibility than the traditionally structured TTO in terms of granting compensation 
and incentives to personnel, with pay levels that can sometimes exceed the university grade 
system (Markman et al. 2005, 243). Private venture extensions were most aggressive at creating 
start-ups and raising capital (Ibid). Of the three TTO archetypes, the for-profit private venture 
extension is best positioned to accelerate new business formation (Markman et al. 2005, 259).  
Siegel, Veugelers and Wright (2007) have put forward a classification of technology 
transfer offices based on their organizational structure. They argue that technology transfer 
offices can be classified into four distinct organizational forms: the functional or unitary form 
(U-form), the multidivisional form (M-form), the holding company form (H-form), and the 
matrix form (MX-form). The authors argue that these structures have different impacts on a 
university's ability to coordinate activity, facilitate internal and external information flows and 
align incentives in a manner consistent with its strategic technology transfer goals (Siegel, 
Veugelers, and Wright 2007, 641).  
                                                           
1
 This typology refers to the structures in United States. For more information, refer to (Markman et al. 2005, 248). 
The authors have provided a description of these structures along with their key features, advantages, and 
examples. 
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  Based on the Siegel-Veugelers-Wright (2007) classification of technology transfer offices, 
Debackere and Veugelers (2005) argue that the matrix structure allows research groups to be 
actively involved and engaged in the commercial exploitation of their own research findings. In a 
matrix structure, the division of research exploitation indeed becomes decentralized and 
integrated within research groups themselves. Only a minimal central technical support 
infrastructure remains to assist the decentralized divisional structure(s) with issues like 
intellectual property management, contract drafting and negotiation, and business plan 
development for spin-offs. 
 The matrix structure is a commercially oriented approach, usually involving commitments 
of resources to commercialize research findings, efforts to capitalize on scale economies in 
supporting services, and direct incentives to researchers and their groups to participate in the 
process. In a matrix structure, accountability (both with respect to revenue and expense 
generation) is located at the level of the research group, which should act as a direct incentive for 
the researchers themselves to actively manage and grow their portfolio of explorative and 
exploitative research activities (Debackere and Veugelers 2005, 329). A matrix structure, 
integrating but yet differentiating exploitation and curiosity-driven academic exploration, 
through a network of research divisions and coordinators, is offered as a structure that should 
allow a university to advance scientific discovery and techno-scientific innovation (Debackere 
and Veugelers 2005, 338).  
2.7. Impediments in Technology Transfer Partnerships 
 Like conventional public-private partnerships, research partnerships can stumble across 
obstacles which hinder their development. Some of the most well documented problems include: 
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the “two culture” problem; uncertainty around viability of the technology; and rigid IP structures. 
While these are commonly cited problems, others can hinder the development of research 
partnerships. Some impediments contemplated by Perez and Sanchez (2003) include lack of 
financial resources, small size of market, excessive risk, lack of information on market features, 
lack of time, lack of information on potential business partners, lack of information on know-
how, and lack of trust among partners (Perez and Sanchez 2003, 824-825). A selection of these 
factors and how they can hinder the technology transfer process are examined in this section. 
2.7.1. Different Cultures 
One of the most cited impediments in the process of effective partnership development is 
the differing ‘cultures’ of the participating organizations. It has been argued numerous times in 
the literature that differing cultures of the participating organizations can impede success. Siegel 
at al. (2004) in their work on technology commercialization have found significant differences in 
cultures across the participating organizations that can significantly hinder the technology 
transfer and commercialization process (Siegel et al. 2004, 125).  
The term ‘culture’ is often used to describe the practices, norms, and rules that exist within 
an organization. One needs to understand that universities and the private sector have different 
sets of organizational practices. These differences arise as a result of different motives, 
perspectives, and ideological beliefs held by participants in each sector regarding the role of 
research in society. Traditionally, the role of university has been in creating and disseminating 
basic scientific knowledge into the society—the academy has come to regard knowledge as a 
public good which should be freely available to all. Accordingly, university researchers consider 
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that it is their duty to make public knowledge generated through their research, most often 
through publishing in peer-reviewed journals.  
The private sector is governed by a different set of motivations and perspectives about the 
nature of technology and knowledge in general. Private firms are mostly motivated by pursuit of 
profits and competitive advantage over commercial rivals. As a result, knowledge is usually held 
confidential and strictly as a private good. Private firms often conduct research in order to extend 
their existing product line or improve those products by introducing process or product 
innovations, which are designed to yield higher profits for the firm. The challenge then is the 
conflicting desire of academia to publish and industry to maintain secrecy to secure intellectual 
property rights and maintain competitive advantage (Dooley and Kirk 2007, 325).  
The stark disparities in the motives, perspectives, and cultures of the three key players in 
this process underscore the potential importance of understanding how organizational factors and 
institutional policies influence the development of effective research partnerships between 
academia and the private sector (Siegel and Veugelers, Reinhilde ,Wright, Mike 2007, 651). Lee 
has referred to this phenomenon as the ‘Two Cultures Problem, ’ suggesting that the normative 
and attitudinal differences separating universities from industry are inexorable and present often 
insurmountable barriers to close cooperation between the two sectors (Lee 1996, 856). 
Differences in the objectives and operational standards across the two sectors can give rise 
to conflicts (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994, 232). The conflicts are further exacerbated due to a 
lack of effective communication between the two sectors. There is often a mismatch of 
information, knowledge, vocabulary, conception or services needed by industry and offered by 
university. When there is a lack of understanding of each other’s ‘culture’ due to poor 
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communication, it gives rise to conflict of interest especially over dissemination of knowledge 
versus its appropriation through commercialization, which in turn hampers the technology 
transfer and commercialization process. 
Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994) have argued that in university-industry relations both 
parties hold strong but heterogeneous bases of power: universities hold strong expert power, 
while companies may have a combination of reward and expert power (Bonaccorsi and 
Piccaluga 1994, 235). Any resulting partnership will often be biased towards the stronger 
partner, which also will need to shoulder greater responsibility due to a stronger position within 
the relationship. These asymmetries in mutual dependence result in an increased perception of 
vulnerability among the other partners and reduce the propensity to open and effective 
collaboration (Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994, 237).  
Universities and the private sector represent two distinct “thought worlds”, with distinct 
languages and organizational routines. Coming to terms with these “thought worlds” is a 
challenge for those seek to participating in a research partnership. Communication failures 
exacerbate the problem further, which leads to misunderstandings and a general lack of trust 
among partners (Bercovitz and Feldmann 2006, 178).  
2.7.2. Uncertainty 
Technology transfer scholars have often pointed towards uncertainty as an important 
challenge. Uncertainty can arise through multiple channels in the technology transfer context. 
The most common of these is technical and commercial uncertainty surrounding certain types of 
innovative activity, such as the application and value of basic research (Siegel and Wright 2007, 
537). The very nature of partnerships which rely on creation and dissemination of new 
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knowledge lies at the heart of such uncertainty. According to Debackere and Veugelers (2005), 
the highly non-codifiable nature of scientific know-how results in high levels of uncertainty 
around the commercial viability of a particular invention. This uncertainty in turn can lead to 
systemic failures in the market for know-how, thus explaining the difficulty of organizing 
research partnerships, specifically those instituted for technology commercialization (Debackere 
and Veugelers 2005, 338).  
Siegel, Veugelers, and Wright (2007) argue that due to the large uncertainty surrounding 
the nature and value of new knowledge, firms typically cannot assess the quality of an invention 
ex ante, at least partly because the invention often is in an embryonic stage of development. 
Meanwhile researchers find it difficult to assess the commercial profitability of their inventions. 
Uncertainty is higher with early stage inventions which make them a riskier prospect for 
commercialization. Private sector managers are typically focused on risk-adjusted returns and the 
highly risky nature of university research reduces the projected private rates of return. As a 
result, managers take a more cautious approach towards these technologies. Significant 
informational asymmetries and uncertainties regarding the potential markets for innovations can 
complicate efforts to collaborate with universities (Siegel and Veugelers, Reinhilde ,Wright, 
Mike 2007, 645).  
Markman et al. (2005) have classified uncertainty around technology transfer and 
commercialization into two continuums. They suggest that uncertainty could arise as a result of 
ambiguity regarding whether a particular technology has market application and ambiguity 
regarding the robustness of the legal protection over the IP (Markman et al. 2005, 252). These 
uncertainties are not mutually exclusive; as a matter of fact they could very well reinforce each 
other at different levels. 
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2.7.3. IP Policies 
While there is significant disagreement over the exact impact of intellectual property 
policies, there is evidence that these policies can have a significant impact on the development of 
effective research partnerships. There are multiple challenges that IP policies can pose in the 
technology transfer process. The presence or absence of IP policies can provide a good signal to 
the firm about the technological capacity of the university. In this regard, the technology transfer 
office within the university has a major role to play. 
University administration can play a key role in setting the direction of IP policies. The 
direct, and often strong, oversight by a university administration limits the autonomy of 
technology transfer office management in matters of decision making, licensing strategies, and 
incentive systems (Markman et al. 2005, 243). In those cases where the university sets the 
direction of the IP policy, there is a tendency within university management to get very 
aggressive about exercising intellectual property rights (Siegel et al. 2004, 118). It has been 
further argued that vague rules regarding the ownership of IP within the university itself can 
create significant distortions in the commercialization process. The IP may not be owned by the 
academic inventor but by the university, creating issues relating to its exploitation through a 
spin-out (Wright, Birley, and Mosey 2004, 241).  
Another potential hindrance comes through the general outlook of the university 
administration towards the potential utilization of university owned IPRs. University and the 
technology transfer offices that project a risk-averse attitude towards commercialization tend to 
be more focused on converting IPRs to cash through licensing. As a result, their focus shifts from 
establishing long-term relationships with industry towards shorter-term relationships generate 
  
 
37 
 
cash flow. These attitudes and policies can severely damage the potential from long-term well 
established relationships with the private sector, leading to sub-optimal commercialization. 
The division of revenue amongst the parties is often an area of rousing debate among 
collaborators. Disagreements are common in this area, with industry claiming that IP from 
universities is often over-priced and ignores the risks industry is exposed through the 
commercialisation process. Universities fear that industry may steal their discoveries and 
generate and appropriate revenue streams that rightly belong to the university. Only through 
defined processes and trust can this challenge be overcome (Dooley and Kirk 2007, 320).  
As a result of these policy rigidities, firms can have great difficulty in dealing with 
universities on IP issues. It has been reported in the literature that a firm’s first dealings with 
university technology transfer office in regards to IP issues usually sets the direction for further 
dealings and collaborations. If an initial experience with the university technology transfer office 
is negative, firms may tend to engage in opportunistic behaviour by contracting directly with 
faculty members, bypassing the university intellectual property apparatus (Bercovitz and 
Feldmann 2006, 178). 
One final notable shortcoming in the operation of most IP systems relates to difficulties in 
enforcing IPRs. Problems can include the high cost of enforcement, sub-optimal regulation, 
conflicting priorities in tackling IPR infringements, and piracy and counterfeiting where copying 
and distribution is facilitated by digitization and the internet. Litigation costs seem to be 
especially problematic (Siegel and Wright 2007, 536).  
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2.7.4. Bureaucratic and Administrative Procedures 
Bureaucratic procedures appear to present another source of barriers in the technology 
transfer process. As mentioned earlier, universities tend to engage in strong oversight of the 
technology transfer process. In many cases the technology transfer office reports to the senior 
university administration, which adds a multitude of complex bureaucratic procedures to the 
process. As a result, the technology transfer office can find itself in situations where its capacity 
to respond quickly to emerging technological inventions is severely constrained.  
Another problem highlighted by Siegel, Veugelers and Wright (2007) and Siegel et al. 
(2004) is the staffing and compensation practices in many technology transfer offices (Siegel, 
Veugelers, and Wright 2007; Siegel et al. 2004). Technology transfer offices are reported to have 
insufficient resources allocated to them, which limits their ability to hire personnel with 
appropriate skills and experience. As a result, technology transfer offices often are poorly 
resourced for carrying out the proper procedures necessary for the commercialization of 
technology. As for compensation, one can look at the general differences between university and 
public sector compensation practices. Incentives are rare for public sector inventors and, which 
universities are more amenable to providing incentives for their researchers they are often much 
less and very limited compared to the private sector. 
2.7.5. Faculty Attitudes 
Faculty members and university researchers who produce technological inventions and 
other academic knowledge have a significant role in the technology transfer and 
commercialization process. Academic researchers can and often do play a role beyond the 
invention stage due to the rich know-how knowledge that they carry with them. However, it is 
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important to understand how faculty attitudes may be at play in the commercialization of specific 
technologies. Older generation faculty members are frequently cited as being more averse to the 
idea of turning academic science into potential revenue-generating avenues. The reason behind 
this is the “public good” mentality usually associated with academic science and knowledge. 
Younger and newer faculty are reportedly more favourable to university technology 
commercialization and partnerships with the private sector, partly in response to the new 
economic development mission of the academy and partly in response to limited government 
funding for university research. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of scepticism within academia 
about the role of private sector in commercializing university generated technologies.  
The “two cultures” problem contributes to this sceptical attitude, as the faculty at times 
misperceives the motives of the private sector. The common perception of partnerships with the 
private sector in academic circles is that they can and at times do jeopardize academic freedom. 
It is a widely held notion that these partnerships convert the academic tradition to what some 
scholars have termed “academic capitalism,” which they fear may jeopardize their right to 
disseminate knowledge freely to the public. Furthermore, some fear increased private sector 
influence in academia could significantly shift the focus of research from upstream basic 
research to more applied downstream research, which many would argue end up degrading the 
quality of research conducted at the university. This argument is usually put forward by those 
followers of the concept of an “intellectual hierarchy” which considers applied science to be 
second class outcome to basic research (Lee 1996, 847).  
Another factor which negatively affects faculty attitudes is the often misaligned 
compensation practices in some partnerships. Traditionally, publishing articles has been a good 
indicator of faculty career achievement. However, entering into partnerships with the private 
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sector or leading a start-up firm can at times restrict or delay faculty from publishing. Part of this 
barrier arises due to time commitments that are required to make a partnership successful, which 
discourages some faculty members from devoting much time and attention to any partnership 
opportunities that would keep them from getting their results published. Moreover, compensation 
systems in universities often do not recognize faculty roles in commercial development of 
technology. As a result, faculty may find few, if any, incentives to participate in a research 
partnership. Lack of incentive structures, including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards 
such as salary increases, tenure, and promotion diminish faculty interest in contributing towards 
building research partnerships with the private sector or to commercialize inventions (Siegel and 
Veugelers, Reinhilde ,Wright, Mike 2007, 645). In those cases where a faculty member does 
participate in the process, he or she usually has to bypass university norms and forgo normal 
compensation routes, searching for benefits through extra-university compensation. 
Faculty attitudes are frequently a function of the general entrepreneurial orientation of the 
institution. While some entrepreneurial skills can be acquired through involvement and 
experience dealing with commercialization of technologies, a large part of the entrepreneurial 
culture is cognitive in nature and is viewed as hardwired into individuals. The behavioural 
underpinnings of faculty attitudes towards commercialization decisions are addressed in greater 
detail in chapter four. 
2.8. Conclusions 
The literature helps us understand the basic conceptions of public-private partnerships as they 
apply to technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. This chapter has presented an 
extensive survey of the literature on partnerships that helps us understand the key features of 
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technology transfer partnerships as well as some of the impediments commonly faced within 
these partnerships. Organizational cultures, IP policies, faculty attitudes and administrative 
procedures are key factors which seem to play a decisive role in determining the efficacy of these 
partnerships. However, most studies focus on just one of these factors at a time. This 
Furthermore, many studies narrowly concentrate on one or two specific cases, without 
effectively developing a comprehensive analytical framework. None of the works reviewed here 
delve into the institutional and behavioural underpinnings of these partnerships. The next two 
chapters undertake that task.  
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Three 
 
Institutional Analysis of Technology 
Transfer Partnerships:  
An IAD Framework Approach 
 
 
The previous chapter highlighted some of the concepts found in the literature regarding the 
technology transfer process and the role of partnerships. Those studies are valuable in that they 
provide an understanding of some of the fundamental issues dealing with research partnerships 
developed to promote technology transfer. However, one problem is that they take a very 
contextual approach. While some attempts have been made to develop a generalized theory of 
technology transfer and innovation processes, they have been less than successful in explaining 
reality. Models such as the contingent effectiveness model of technology transfer are too 
simplistic, often focusing on technical aspects such as intellectual property rights and 
consequently failing to capture the complexity of the entire process. While more dynamic models 
such as the Triple Helix are closer to the institutional reality, their design implies more 
dynamism than can be explained within the confines of those institutional structures. In other 
words, the Triple Helix model fails to specify the institutional tools that can help us unpack the 
complexity of technology transfer partnerships or the broader innovation systems.. Missing from 
these models and the larger cannon of literature on technology transfer partnerships is an 
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institutional formalization of various aspects of technology transfer processes. Without 
formalizing the organizational interactions and individual motivations, which are at the heart of 
any innovative process, it is not possible to understand the dynamics of technology transfer.  
This chapter adapts an institutional approach to the analysis of technology transfer 
partnerships, in order to provide a systematic approach to enable the reader to capture the 
underlying dynamics of the technology transfer and commercialization process. This paper uses 
the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework as the foundational building block 
of analysis. This particular approach offers the opportunity to capture both static and dynamic 
interactions in a complex innovation system. As shown below, the IAD framework has the 
capacity to decompose a complex system into its constituent sub-systems and allow the analyst 
to focus on one particular aspect, in this case the dynamics of technology transfer partnerships, 
which are essentially a sub-systemic component of the broader innovation system.  
An institutional approach using IAD is preferred over more traditional economic models 
such as principal-agent theory for two primary reasons. Firstly, the principal-agent theory does 
not account for the horizontal nature of such complex systems where vertical lines of authority 
are difficult to establish. It may be helpful in understanding intra-organizational situations such 
as the university-technology transfer office-researcher relationship, but it fails to capture the 
dynamism of cross-organizational initiatives where participants belong to different organizations. 
Secondly, traditional economic models fail to capture the cognitive limitations of individual 
participants who shape these systems. As we show in chapter four, assumptions of 
comprehensive rationality do not hold across many complex situations and that is where 
traditional models of economic incentives usually fail to explain the interactions between 
individuals who participate in these systems. 
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This chapter has three main sections: the institutional theories and their critiques; a brief 
overview of the IAD framework; and an exercise to map the technology transfer process using 
the framework.  
 3.1. Defining Institutions- Conceptual Clarifications 
There are multiple views held by theorists about the defining elements of institutions, as 
well as their role in different systems. The most commonly held view that has informed a great 
deal of analysis to date is that of economic institutionalism. The classical economic theory posits 
that institutions do not matter much in establishing a market structure (North 1993, 1). However, 
recent works tend to disagree with this notion. Douglass North, in his seminal work on 
institutionalism and neo-classical economics, has argued that “institutions form the incentive 
structure of a society and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the 
underlying determinant of economic performance” (ibid). According to North, institutions are 
the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. These can be divided into 
formal and informal constraints--formal constraints consist of rules, laws, and constitutions, 
whereas informal constraints are comprised of norms of behaviour, conventions, and self-
imposed codes of conduct. Together with enforcement characteristics, these constraints define 
the incentive structure of societies and economies (North 1993, 2). Institutions are extremely 
important for understanding inefficient markets where the transaction costs have the tendency to 
outweigh other benefits that can be garnered through market interactions.  
While North (1981, 1993) has put forward the economic rationale of institutions, others 
have formulated divergent conceptions of institutions. Schotter (1981), for example, argues that 
the main function of institutions is that of information organizers. According to this view, 
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institutions reduce uncertainty by translating past experiences into institutional rules which then 
become a guide for future expectations. The more institutions encode expectations, the more they 
reduce uncertainty and solve problems which arise from boundedly rational behaviour of 
individual actors (Edquist and Johnson 2005, 43). Therefore, the information organization role of 
institutions plays a vital role in the economic, political, and social setup that surrounds us.  
Edquist and Johnson (2005) have suggested a broad definition of institutions by combining 
the different elements of institutional theories that have been put forward previously. They define 
institutions as sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate 
the relations and interactions between individuals and groups (Edquist and Johnson 2005, 46). 
Based on this definition, the authors develop a multidimensional taxonomical classification of 
institutions. This taxonomy relies on the differences between formal and informal institutions, 
hard and soft institutions, as well as basic and supporting institutions. Both basic and supporting 
institutions can be formal or informal as well as hard or soft. Such taxonomy allows one to use 
the combination that fits the context most appropriately.  
Despite the work done by institutional theorists, there is still a great deal of confusion 
around the concept of institution, at least partly as a result of lack of clear institutional grammar. 
For example, the concept of rules and norms as they relate to institutions is used interchangeably 
in extremely varied contexts. Similarly, one can commonly find  a conflation of the terms 
institutions versus organizations. The use of these terms is commonly misplaced in the literature. 
It is only recently that institutional theorists have started to acknowledge these problems. Ostrom 
(2005) has highlighted both these issues in her work on developing the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework. The underlying components of the IAD and how they apply to 
technology transfer partnerships is addressed below. Before delving into institutional analysis, it 
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is important to situate the innovation systems and their components within the broader 
institutional literature.  
3.1.1. Innovation Systems and Institutions 
In addition to laying down a classification of institutions, Edquist and Johnson have 
applied the concept of institutions to innovation systems. They argue that institutions affect the 
innovation process by shaping the interactive learning process between individuals. In the 
context of innovation systems, institutions perform three basic functions: reduce uncertainty by 
providing information; manage conflicts and cooperation; and provide incentives. As shown in 
the previous chapter, uncertainty, conflicts, and lack of incentives are the main barriers to 
innovation and technology transfer. Institutions can reduce, if not eliminate, these barriers and 
aid the innovation processes.  
The very nature of innovation and technology transfer processes introduces a great deal of 
uncertainty into the system. When it comes to research partnerships, the partners are uncertain 
about future expectations—they seldom know whether or not a technology will prove profitable 
when introduced into the market. In the absence of governing institutional mechanisms such as 
patent laws or other intellectual property rights, uncertainty over the ability to appropriate returns 
on technology can discourage stakeholders from entering into partnerships. Institutional 
structures are therefore a necessity when it comes to establishing effective technology transfer 
partnerships. While uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated, it can be reduced by providing 
pertinent information to the actors involved in a research partnership.  
In the case of research partnerships where stakeholders frequently do not have much 
experience dealing with each other, there is always a potential that conflicts could arise between 
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the participants. Having well established institutions in these cases can help participants 
overcome insecurities. In such circumstances, institutions can spell out the constraints and 
boundaries for each actor . In addition, institutions can define the power structures within a 
research partnership by establishing clear responsibilities for participants. When, in reality or in 
the perception of participants, there is a mis-calibration of power structures, institutions can also 
help realign these power imbalances.  
Institutions can further provide incentives to the participants in partnerships. It has been 
argued that incentives provided to individual faculty members can provide a key motivation to 
engage in entrepreneurial activities. Institutions can facilitate partnerships by targeting the 
incentives towards the specific requirements of individual participants depending on their 
organizational affiliation. Therefore, the incentives offered to a university scientist can differ 
substantially from those offered to a public sector researcher or to a private sector manager. 
Incentives can also be negative in nature. In other words, they can constrain certain behaviours 
by outlining the consequences (penalties) of engaging in such behaviours.  
As highlighted, institutions can facilitate the process of establishing research partnership 
by governing aspects of information, uncertainty, pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives, and 
conflict management. Many other factors, which will be dealt with in the following sections, can 
make the technology transfer process more efficient. In order to carefully assess which 
institutional factors affect the technology transfer partnerships, one can follow the IAD 
framework and map out the various components of this framework onto the technology transfer 
partnerships.  
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3.2. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework  
The IAD has been put forward as an attempt to explain the institutional underpinnings of 
many of the complex problems faced in today’s world. The intention behind developing such a 
framework was to coherently and comprehensively deconstruct the complexly nested layers of 
organizational environment, actors, rules, and the anticipated outcomes. The focus of this 
framework is not just on the organizational structures; it also unfolds the complex layers of 
interactions between actors and the organizational codes as well as interactions among the actors 
themselves. It highlights the behavioural underpinnings of many of the problems and the 
complex solutions that emerge in institutional contexts. In doing so, it sheds light on the 
feedback loops between the exogenous environment, the community, the rules, the action 
situation, the actors and their interactions with the exogenous and endogenous variables, and 
finally the outcomes. The IAD takes into account that the connections between any two or more 
of these variables are not linear; rather they are complexly nested within each other. This, as 
many critics argue, adds to the already complex and dynamic picture of institutional analysis. 
However, if understood properly, the IAD framework puts forward a coherent vocabulary for the 
study of institutions. Applied correctly, it can help resolve much of the institutional complexity 
surrounding any given problem without taking away any of the pertinent details. 
The IAD framework takes a systems approach to policy processes, whereby inputs, policy-
makers, outputs, outcomes, evaluative criteria, and feedback effects are connected to each other 
in a dynamic manner. Ostrom argues that any complex system can be viewed as being composed 
of “holons,” which constitute the complete sub-systems within an overarching system. These 
sub-systems, in any complex adaptive system, “can be ‘dissected’ into its constituent branches 
on which the holons represent the nodes of the tree, and the lines connecting them the channels 
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of communication, control or transportation” (Ostrom 2005, 12). It may be argued that in a 
complex system, it may be a difficult task to comprehensively analyze and understand the 
overarching system by just analyzing the underlying constituent branches. However, the notion 
of complex systems, as put forward by Simon (1955), suggests that the sub-system within an 
overarching complex system is a complete system by itself which can be understood on its own 
while keeping the dynamics of the overarching system constant. However, if one wants to 
understand the system from a broader perspective, the level of analysis can always be shifted up 
through the interlinked channels which bring the underlying sub-systems together. 
These intricacies of complex systems are quite comprehensively and conveniently captured 
by the IAD framework. The framework formalizes the analysis by clearly spelling out the 
constituent parts and providing a coherent understanding of what these components mean for the 
entire system. It also highlights the fact that many of the interactions within and across the sub-
systems occur simultaneously at multiple levels. The IAD framework therefore provides the 
institutional analyst with the luxury either to analyze the system as a whole or to focus on a set of 
sub-systems independently or jointly. It is this very flexibility that is utilized in this paper; 
instead of focusing on the entire system, this exercise focuses on only the exogenous variables 
and the action arenas. More specifically, the rules and the participants and the linkages between 
them are explored in depth. Other parts of the framework, while potentially valuable for such an 
analysis, will be left for future inquiry. 
Another key analytical feature of the IAD is that it allows the analyst to account for 
possibilities of polycentric governance. Polycentric governance is defined as  
a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of 
authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the 
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citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints 
put upon their activities for public purposes (McGinnis 2011, 171). 
 
Given that most knowledge-based economies rely on polycentric systems of governance, it is 
imperative for the analyst to be able to dissect the underlying components of a system to be able 
to point out the governing forces which are exerting an influence on that sub-system and in turn 
on the overall system. In the context of research partnerships, multi-sectoral and multi-functional 
polycentric governance becomes the key focus of governing paradigms. These levels of 
governance can highlight the processes within hybrid organizations arising from interactions of 
actors and organizations, such as in the case of research partnerships where the public and 
private sectors interact with academia and with each other in a dynamic manner.  
At the simplest analytical level, the IAD framework can be viewed as consisting of 
exogenous variables, an action arena, and the interaction between these, the outcomes, and the 
evaluative criteria. All these variables have feedback effects on each other, which keeps 
transforming the system as a whole as well as the variables themselves. The elements defining 
the exogenous variables include biophysical or material conditions, attributes of community, and 
rules. The action arena is composed of the action situations and participants. The interactions 
between the action arena and the exogenous variables determine the outcomes, which are then 
evaluated using the criteria appropriate for the given system. The outcomes are fed back onto the 
action arena and the exogenous variables which results in transformations in one of the holons or 
in the entire system or in both. While it is important to gain an understanding of all the 
institutional components of a system, only the exogenous variables, action arenas and the 
interactions between these holons will be considered in greater depth in the context of 
technology transfer partnerships. This is not to suggest that outcomes and evaluative criteria are 
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not important in technology transfer partnerships. However, to delve into outcome and evaluative 
criteria would require analysis at a much larger level, which is beyond the scope of this exercise. 
By focusing solely on the exogenous variables and action arenas one can gain significant insights 
into the dynamics of developing technology transfer partnerships, which can be used to structure 
the analysis of these partnerships at other levels.  
 
Figure 3.1. Components of the IAD Framework 
Source: Ostrom 2005, 15. 
 
3.3. Mapping the Technology Transfer Process onto the IAD Framework 
The previous chapter showed some of the key features of research partnerships as well as 
some of the commonly cited impediments to establishing effective research and technology 
transfer partnerships. This section maps some of those features onto the institutional framework. 
Further, it shows how an understanding of institutional characteristics of technology transfer 
partnerships can help eliminate some of the impediments. Using the defining elements of the 
IAD, one can analyze each of these elements as they apply to technology transfer partnerships. 
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3.3.1. Attributes of the Community 
As the first step, one has to define the exogenous variables of the IAD related to 
technology transfer. One of the most fundamental variables in this regard is the attributes of the 
community. The community of technology transfer partnerships is formed through the coming 
together of individuals from different organizations whose institutional values differ from each 
other considerably. This makes it extremely difficult to classify the attributes of the technology 
transfer partnership community into a common framework. Another problem with technology 
transfer partnerships and innovation systems in general, is that the community is not static. It is a 
dynamic entity, where the organizational boundaries of the participants are blurred. As a result of 
these blurred organizational boundaries, the actors within a technology transfer community can 
keep changing their identities. Many times, the participants in a technology transfer partnership 
are holding multiple positions across different organizations. One example of such dynamic 
character adoption is when the bench scientist or faculty member from the participating 
university starts taking an active interest in the technology commercialization and therefore has 
to adopt the qualities and characteristics of an entrepreneur. In such cases, his or her affiliation 
cannot be bound to the technology transfer community only. The fluidity in individual identities 
within such partnerships can cause serious problems in defining a boundary around the 
community. 
Despite the lack of common institutional backgrounds, a technology transfer community 
can be established through iterative interactions. In the case where the attributes of community 
are not favourable to establishing a collaborative environment, open communications can help 
build trust, reciprocity, and favourable perceptions. In addition, technology transfer partnerships 
usually boast valuable social capital, which comes together from different organizational 
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backgrounds. Presence of such varied social capital can enhance the stability of networks 
developed within a partnership. Individuals can develop personal ties with other participants and 
share knowledge with each other. The sharing of knowledge can help develop an organizational 
code and establish a community which shares common values.  
One key to developing a high-functioning technology transfer community in the absence of 
historical interaction is to provide the community with time to adopt an organizational code. 
Over time, the partnership community can gain experience through mutual knowledge sharing. 
The knowledge sharing could be based on technical know-how knowledge, as well as knowledge 
about organizational practices such as rules, norms, and strategies that should be implemented 
within the technology transfer community. Organizations such as these partnerships exhibit 
increasing returns to experience. In this context, the feedback loops from outcomes, evaluative 
criteria, action arenas, and rules can positively enhance trust, reciprocity, and understanding of 
common values between the participants. Not only do the individual participants learn from the 
organizational code by adapting to rules and common values of the partnership, the 
organizational setup of the partnership can also socialize to their languages, beliefs, and practices 
(March 1991). In this sense, not only do the individuals evolve, but the organizations also evolve 
over time. This is a characteristic of any complex system. 
3.3.2. Biophysical and Material Conditions 
In the technology transfer process, voice content of a good is also deemed important. 
Phillips (2007) has argued that if production or consumption of an innovative good depends on 
information provided by others, it is deemed to have high voice content. In knowledge-based 
economic systems, this is judged to be of critical value as both production and consumption 
depend on interdependencies of others using and contributing value (Phillips 2007, 238). In the 
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technology transfer process the three factors (rivalry, excludability, and voice) have a combined 
effect on the entire system. In innovation systems, as well as technology transfer systems, most 
of the focus is on goods and services which can exhibit a mixture of these properties. Therefore, 
while some goods can be classified as purely public, private, or common pool, there is an array 
of hybrid goods with a mix of these three properties. The exact nature of a product being 
disseminated through a technology transfer partnership can determine the exact governing 
mechanism that should be applied.  
When one focuses on governing these attributes of a good or service, there is a multitude of 
possibilities that can arise. Production and dissemination of pure public goods, for example, are 
thought to be best dealt with by the state. Similarly markets and civil authorities are better suited 
to oversee the provision of private and common pool goods respectively. The case of hybrid 
goods is more complicated. With hybrid goods, it is difficult to determine the best institutional 
setup to govern transactions. Sometimes one of the pure organizational spheres, such as states, 
markets or civil authorities can accommodate and manage the delivery of the good; at other 
instances some form of a hybrid organization is required, where the knowledge and expertise 
from two or more of the domains is needed to effectively and efficiently deliver the good. In 
addition, there is also a potential for path dependency in the institutional and governance systems 
for hybrid goods. From this analysis, one can infer that public-private technology transfer 
partnerships are best suited to deal with hybrid goods. With a mix of public and private 
organizations as well as organizations that are of a quasi-public nature, partnerships can employ 
a variety of governing mechanisms. The institutional setup of these partnerships can allow them 
to develop, adopt and adapt to the changing dynamics of hybrid goods. If the institutional 
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structure of these partnerships is properly developed, it can greatly facilitate the production and 
dissemination of innovative technologies with the hybrid characteristics. 
3.3.3. Rules 
When speaking of research partnerships, specifically technology transfer and 
commercialization partnerships, rules are the key in defining institutional characteristics. Using 
the IAD framework, one can apply the concept of rules to the research and technology transfer 
partnerships in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the governing mechanisms within 
these partnerships. While all the different generic rules set out in the IAD can be applied to the 
partnership, these may need to be modified given the context. The following figure presents a 
generic effect of rules on the system. In the following sections, we develop these rules as they 
apply to technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. 
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Figure 3.2.  Rules and their impact on various components of the system 
Source: Ostrom 2005, 189 
 
 
i. Position Rules 
Defining the position rules is the first step in mapping out the entire set of rules for 
technology transfer partnerships. Position rules, in essence, define the characteristics of 
stakeholders for the partnership. These can be used to highlight the organizational capacities of 
all the participating organizations. They also help identify the resources, skills, and knowledge 
that each of these stakeholders would be able to bring forward (Ostrom 2005, 193-194). As one 
may imagine, the organizational capacities, resources, and knowledge contained within each 
sphere can differ substantially. These differences can be both good and bad for the development 
of a partnership. On the one hand, they introduce diversity into the organizational practices of the 
partnership; on the other hand, they can cause numerous problems in organizing the stakeholders 
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in the first place. Position rules can allow sorting out these differences by finding synergies 
across the participating organizations and only allow those characteristics to define the 
organizational structure of the partnership which are beneficial for its effective functioning.  
Position rules can also help establish the number and variety of participants by defining the 
number of positions within a partnership. By doing so, these rules can effectively determine the 
power structure assigned to each position and consequently to each participating organization 
(Ostrom 2005, 193). Unless there is only one type of position specified, one can assume a 
hierarchic power structure to be operational within the research partnership. Creating positions 
within a research partnership can be a complicated task, as each organization has its own set of 
position rules within the respective organizational setup. By taking into account each 
organization’s resources and knowledge capacities, position rules can help establish a clear set of 
expectations for each of those involved in a partnership. However, in order to be effective, 
position rules need to be complemented by authority and boundary rules, which define the 
responsibilities of the participants holding any given position within the organizational setup of 
the partnership.  
ii. Boundary Rules 
Boundary rules, which are also frequently known as entry and exit rules, define the 
eligibility to enter a position, as well the process through which eligible participants may enter or 
leave the position (Ostrom 2005, 194). Within technology transfer partnerships, boundary rules 
determine the conditions by which an organization or an individual may become a partner. The 
first-order boundary rules define the eligibility of individuals to be members. For example, in 
technology transfer partnerships, faculties of science, engineering, or medicine and their 
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respective faculty members would be eligible to be part of the partnership since they contribute 
towards developing a technology. Similarly, private sector firms and their managers can join a 
partnership if they are active in the technology sector and have the required set of resources to 
effectively market a technology. Public sector organizations may find themselves eligible for a 
partnership through their oversight and regulatory role. The membership of a research 
partnership is therefore heavily dependent on the eligibility criteria, which in turn depends on the 
projected outcomes of the partnership. In other words, the proposed objective of a partnership 
will determine which organizational or individual entity is eligible to participate in the 
partnership. In addition, eligibility to join a partnership may also depend on an organization’s or 
an individual’s experience with such projects. Some faculty members or firms may have a 
history of successful collaborations with other organizational spheres. Their experiences, 
therefore, can contribute to establishing an effective partnership between the three organizational 
spheres.  
Boundary rules can also determine whether the participants (organizations or individuals) 
have control over their decision to be part of the partnership or not. As Ostrom has suggested, 
open boundary rules allow eligible participants full control over the decision. These rules can be 
conceived in terms of invitation and compulsion. Boundary rules are considered to be invitations 
when they authorize holders of a position to select further holders from the set of those who are 
eligible. Boundary rules are compulsory when eligible participants have no control over whether 
they fill a position or not (Ostrom 2005, 195). Any combination of these rules can be found in 
practice; however, given the nature of research partnerships, one can assume that open and 
invitational rules would dominate. Partnerships are established through voluntary agreement of 
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different organizations and individuals in order to achieve a common goal. To impose 
compulsory boundary rules in such circumstances could be detrimental for any partnership.  
One of the problems in establishing a technology transfer partnership is the fluidity of the 
representatives of the participating organizations. Individuals who represent various 
organizational spheres are extremely mobile. Especially in a dynamic knowledge-based 
economy, where organizational boundaries are blurred and individuals’ characteristics are 
continuously changing as a result of interactions with other organizational spheres, it is 
extremely difficult to retain institutional memory. However, once a technology transfer 
partnership is established, individuals can take up roles within the partnering organizations and 
institutional memory can be created and preserved. For example, faculty members who are 
usually responsible for producing innovative technologies can take on the role of entrepreneurs 
and managers once their technology is introduced in the market. Similarly, technology transfer 
officers, who act as a liaison between industry and university, frequently switch their positions 
between industry and university as they follow opportunities.  
One of the keys to successful technology transfer and commercialization identified in the 
literature is that transfer of know-how and tacit knowledge often can and frequently must flow 
along with a physical technology or product. In the absence of involved individuals, the process 
could collapse. It can become difficult to establish issue ownership in such partnerships, where 
individuals cannot be retained for long periods. In such situations, a subset of boundary rules, 
known as succession rules, can prove key for the effective functioning of a partnership. 
Succession rules define who is eligible to move from one position to another and what criteria 
must be met to fill a vacant position. Through the use of boundary rules, procedures can be 
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established to ensure efficient transition for those who move out of the partnership and for those 
who move into their positions. 
iii. Choice/Authority Rules 
The next set of rules that needs to be established for a technology transfer partnership is 
choice or authority rules. These rules specify what a participant occupying a position must, must 
not, or may do at a particular point in the light of conditions that have, or have not, been met at 
that point in the process. The permissibility of actions is dependent on the position of a 
participant, history of actions taken on that position, and attributes of relevant state variables 
(Ostrom 2005, 200). These rules effectively define the power structure within a partnership. 
They highlight the responsibilities assigned to each participating individual or organization. In 
order to define these authority or choice rules, one can apply the grammar of institutions as 
developed by Ostrom. Applying the mnemonic ADICO2 enables the institutional analyst to 
determine the permissibility of an action under a pre-defined set of conditions. One example of 
choice rules, commonly used in technology transfer partnerships, is intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). IPRs determine the licensing terms (conditions) attached to the appropriation (action) by 
a participant (private firm). One of the critical component of these rules is the OR ELSE 
statement, which determines the consequences for the decision-making individual in the case 
where the conditions are not met. Therefore, these rules introduce accountability to the actions of 
a participant.  
                                                           
2
 ADICO is referred to as the ‘syntax of institutional grammar’ by Ostrom. ATTRIBUTES is a holder for any value of a 
participant-level variable that distinguishes to who the institutional statement applies (Ostrom 2005, 139). 
DEONTIC component draws on the modal operations used in deontic logic to distinguish prescriptive from non-
prescriptive statements. The set of DEONTIC operators comprises of permitted (P), obliged (O), and forbidden (F) 
(Ostrom 2005, 141-142). The AIM is the specific description of a working part in an action situation to which an 
institutional statement refers (Ostrom 2005, 148). CONDITIONS indicate the set of variables that define when and 
where an institutional statement applies (Ostrom 2005, 149). OR ELSE specifies a range of possible punishments if 
a rule is not followed (Ibid). 
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iv. Aggregation Rules 
One of the most significant advantages of applying authority rules to a technology transfer 
partnership is that they help develop a clear set of expectations for participants. By highlighting 
the expectations from each of the participants in terms of the permissibility of actions, these rules 
can significantly reduce the conflicts that may arise between actors from different organizational 
spheres. In addition, these rules are flexible enough that when facing a modification in the range 
of assigned actions, they can affect the basic rights, duties, liberties, and exposures of members 
and the relative distribution of power among the participants (Ostrom 2005, 202).  
While authority rules define individual responsibilities, individual actions need to be 
aggregated when there are multiple participants and decision makers. Technology transfer 
partnerships, which consist of multiple participants from various organizational spheres, require 
an effective mode of combining the voices of these participants into a combined decision which 
reflects the partnership as a whole. In cases where each of the organizational participants have 
their individual concerns and are motivated by different interests, lack of rules to aggregate the 
individual decisions from different nodes can create significant problems. Therefore, 
transformation of individual actions into combined decision making requires aggregation rules. 
These rules determine whether a decision of a single participant takes precedence over decisions 
by other participants or the decision of a majority applies in a given action situation.  
Ostrom has highlighted two subsets of aggregation rules: non-symmetric aggregation rules 
and symmetric aggregation rules. Non-symmetric rules treat the participants in a situation 
differently in regard to some decision to be made at some point in a decision process while 
symmetric rules assign joint control over an action to multiple participants so that all are treated 
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alike (Ostrom 2005, 202-203). In the case of technology transfer partnerships, one may argue, 
aggregation rules have to be symmetrically distributed across all the participants in order to 
develop a sense of equal responsibility across the participating organizations. Unless any single 
participant or organization is unambiguously better suited to make decisions around a particular 
action situation, non-symmetrical aggregation rules are bound to create insecurity among the 
participants. By applying symmetrical decision aggregation rules, technology transfer 
partnerships can ensure that conflict is minimized and participants do not feel left out. 
Another important subset of aggregation rules highlighted by Ostrom is the qualification of 
“No-Agreement” rules. These rules are to govern those situations where there is a disagreement 
between participants in an action situation. These rules can be thought of as an aggregative 
version of OR ELSE as they apply to individual choice rules. These conditions, in a collaborative 
environment, can specify the consequences of not reaching an agreement. These consequences 
could be related to the final outcomes or the payoffs to the participants. Some of the 
consequences that may arise as a result of invoking no-agreement include status-quo, all-or-
nothing, random allocation, or external mediation to achieve a certain outcome (Ostrom 2005, 
205). Without clearly spelling out no-agreement rules, technology transfer partnerships could run 
into a deadlock situation, which may effectively end the collaboration. 
v. Information Rules 
Availability of information is a key determinant in making effective decisions within a 
partnership. Information is especially important considering that participants in technology 
transfer partnerships come from different organizational, professional and academic backgrounds 
and they bring different pieces of information of varying value. In such settings, asymmetries of 
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information can affect the effective functioning of the partnership. Therefore, it is imperative that 
the production and dissemination of information within a partnership be governed through some 
form of information rules, which in turn can inform the participants of the current state of 
individual state variables, the previous and current moves of other participants in positions, and 
their own past moves (Ostrom 2005, 206). By having an impact on these variables, information 
rules basically affect the level of information available to participants.  
Information rules can also determine the most effective channel for communicating among 
the group members by highlighting the required, permitted, or forbidden channels of 
communication. In technology transfer partnerships, previous literature has highlighted the need 
for effective communication channels in order to build trust between the partners. In addition, the 
frequency of exchange of information is also deemed important in determining how well the 
information is managed within a partnership. Especially in the cases where the partnership is 
recently developed and there is limited historical information available, frequency of information 
exchange can enhance organizational learning within the partnership. Therefore, by managing 
the availability of information, dissemination channels, and frequency of exchange, information 
rules can effectively govern the information aspect of a partnership, a crucial element in long 
term development. 
vi. Payoff Rules 
Payoffs are thought to be the most critical motivating factor for any of the participants in a 
technology transfer partnership. They are also considered important for aligning the interests of 
participants with the interests of the organization. Payoff structures can affect the decision 
making process at the individual level as well as the organizational level. The most contested 
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arguments surround the payoff structures instituted within a university and their impact on a 
faculty member's decision to participate in a partnership. It has been suggested that payoff 
structures within academia have a negative influence on participation in technology transfer 
partnerships, as more reward is allocated for academic publications but not for technology 
transfer and commercialization activities (Friedman and Silberman 2003, 17-30). Since these 
rules directly impact the net costs and benefits of action or outcomes for actors in an action 
situation, it is imperative that the payoff rules dealing with extrinsic rewards to the participating 
faculty members be flexible enough to accommodate the realities of a knowledge based 
economy.  
Another aspect of payoff structures that requires formalized rules is profit sharing from the 
appropriation of a given technology at an aggregate level. One of the biggest impediments in 
transforming technology into marketable products is disagreement over licensing fees, royalties, 
and profit sharing from commercialization (Hall, Link, and Scott 2000). These decisions can be 
effectively governed by a combination of payoff rules and disagreement rules. These rules can 
account both for the share of costs borne by individual participants and the resource efficiencies 
of each of the organizations. 
vii. Scope Rules 
The last rules which need to be implemented at the organizational level are scope rules. 
Scope rules are required to determine which of the outcomes are affected by a certain action 
originating from within an action arena. These can be used alternatively to assess the value of an 
action (Ostrom 2005, 208-210). For example, these can provide an effective alternative to the 
common evaluative and payoff rules within academic departments of universities where, instead 
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of judging the quality of research through journal publications, some individuals might be 
assessed based on efforts to transform technology into commercial products or services. As 
Ostrom has argued, strong norms and rules governing academic freedom render many university 
rules governing specific teaching and research activities suspect, while rules that base 
promotions on outcomes for professors may be seen as much more legitimate (Ostrom 2005, 
209). Therefore, instead of aiming for various inputs, these rules can shift the focus onto 
outcomes. 
3.3.4.  Action Arena and Action Situations 
In a technology transfer partnership, an analysis of action arenas and situations would 
enable the analyst to gain an understanding of the dynamic interactions between participants, 
their actions and the linkage between actions and outcomes, as well as the costs and benefits of 
actions and outcomes (Ostrom 2005, 351). However, much of this analysis depends on the level 
of analysis--that is whether the analysis is conducted at the operational, collective, constitutional, 
or meta-constitutional choice level. An analysis at each of these levels requires one to consider 
the impact of different combinations of exogenous factors on the action arena. It also suggests 
that the various rules influencing the action arena would have differential propensities for 
transformation given the level of analysis.  
In technology transfer partnerships, the interactions between participants are a critical 
factor in establishing the efficacy of these partnerships. Once again, these interactions are 
governed by different rules at different levels. While operational choices may be the easiest to 
make since they concern day-to-day activities of an organization, choices at the other three levels 
may prove extremely difficult if not impossible to govern. Problems arise mainly as a result of 
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different organizational and institutional backgrounds of the participants within a technology 
transfer partnership. It is therefore essential that one understands the effect of these analytical 
levels, both from top-down and bottom-up perspectives, and analyze how each affects the next 
level.  
The meta-constitutional level in a technology transfer partnership is comprised of 
governing institutions of the participating organizations. These institutions exert a significant 
influence on the functioning of a partnership. For example, the various governing institutions in a 
university can severely constrain the actions of those who represent the university in a 
technology transfer partnership. Similar constraints may be in operation over participants from 
two other spheres. In order for the meta-constitutional level to effectively translate into the 
constitutional level, the institutional structures of all participating organizations need to be 
completely synchronized with each other. However, this is effectively impossible to achieve 
given the time constraints in technology commercialization. Institutional practices are 
historically embedded in each of the organizations. Institutional evolution at this level may be 
the most difficult task to achieve in the context of technology transfer partnerships. Even though, 
some analysts argue that the “culture” of these organizations is catching up with the changing 
realties, evolutionary movements are often too slow. Consequently, they end up affecting the 
speed of institutional evolution within the technology transfer partnership.  
Situations at the constitutional level are those which need to be resolved at the inception of 
a partnership. These situations, which are governed by constitutional choice rules, determine the 
effective rules that govern both collective choice and operational choice situations. In technology 
transfer partnerships these may involve establishing the proposed objective of the partnership, 
the number of participants, their effective role within the partnership and modes of interactions. 
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These choices are usually highlighted in a proposal for establishing a partnership and are 
effectively developed before a partnership is functional. 
 Choices at the collective level of decision-making affect various organizational processes 
including cost-benefit decisions to commercialize a specific technology, the marketing structure, 
and the payoffs. These decisions are in turn affected by choice rules operating at the individual 
and collective levels. Collective choice problems involve participation of various actors 
simultaneously and combining their individual actions into a collective outcome. They are also 
affected by the information available to the group regarding past actions and outcomes from 
similar situations, as well as by the social capital available within the organization. Collective 
choice situations highlight the opportunities available regarding a particular situation that is 
being dealt with at any given point in time. Consequently, they establish the link between actions 
and outcomes within that particular action situation. It must be noted here that in technology 
transfer partnerships, collective choice situations are affected by multiple control variables 
functioning within the organization. In essence, individual actions may be necessary conditions 
for an outcome, but they are not sufficient to guarantee that outcome. Technology transfer 
partnerships are riddled with stochastic disturbances, represented in the transformation function, 
which may be aggravated at the collective choice level. Therefore, it is necessary to account for 
the probabilistic nature of collective choice decisions within a partnership in order to gain 
comprehensive understanding of the action-outcome linkages in the technology transfer 
partnership.  
Operational choice decisions, as mentioned earlier, are the most flexible and easiest to 
understand in the context of technology transfer partnerships. These decisions are governed by 
operational choice rules which affect individual decision making. One of the key factors 
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influencing the actions and decisions of individuals at this level is the availability of information 
to each individual about the actions and decisions of others. Especially in the case of technology 
transfer partnerships, where participating organizations may have different underlying motives, 
availability of information may critically affect the actions and decisions at the individual level. 
With asymmetric and incomplete information, participants may behave opportunistically when 
outcomes are jointly determined at the collective choice level. Consequently, behaviours can 
prove to be detrimental to the efficiency of the partnership and, therefore, may need to be 
governed through rules to alter these behaviours. 
Going from the meta-constitutional level to the operational level is only one way of 
analyzing the different scales of the picture. If one is more interested in the working dynamics of 
a partnership once it has been developed, then the analysis of action situations and action arenas 
can be reversed. Conducting an analysis in that fashion allows the analyst to understand the 
dynamics of institutional change within the organization and at the broader societal level. 
However, to conduct such an analysis one has to ensure that there is a defining set of rules 
already in place and the analysis can only apply to the rate of transformation in those rules from 
the individual to organizational to societal level.  
i. Uncertainty 
One of the key impediments, as highlighted in chapter one, is the uncertain outcomes of 
technology commercialization—the embryonic state of technology, market application potential, 
and statutes of effective legal protection are key sources of uncertainty in technology transfer 
partnerships. However, this is not the full story. While these factors do add to the risk of 
unsuccessful outcomes from technology commercialization, uncertainty in the context of 
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technology transfer partnerships usually arises from social interactions between participants, as 
well as conflicts between organizational practices of the participant organizations. Many social 
interactions in the world are characterized by certain indeterminacy. It is complicated even 
further where action arenas are composed of multiple participants from different institutional 
backgrounds, as is the case in technology transfer partnerships. In such cases, the probabilities of 
specific actions leading to outcomes are unknowable (Ostrom 2005, 49). 
The uncertainty in these situations can be reduced by undertaking a repeated game 
theoretic approach within the institutional framework. The literature on game theory suggests 
that in these situations, participants can still achieve optimal outcomes, provided the situation is 
repeated over time and the actions of other participants are observable through codified rules. 
Such repeated observations in the case of technology transfer partnerships can be best captured 
through the institutional analysis framework. The framework has the unique capacity to allow for 
feedback loops to operate on not just the action situation but other exogenous variables as well. 
These feedbacks ensure that over time uncertainty is reduced, if not completely eliminated. 
Through feedbacks participants in an action situation have the opportunity to observe the actions 
of themselves and their peers within the partnership. These feedbacks reduce uncertainty by 
giving the participants an opportunity to make decisions informed through historical projections.  
ii. Nested Holons 
Another characteristic of action arenas, action situations and rules within the institutional 
analysis framework is their nesting with other action arenas, situations and rules. While holons 
are used to govern one specific problem within a system, they are also linked to other arenas 
within the broader system (Ostrom 2005, 351). In the case of a technology transfer partnership, 
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the action situation is deeply entrenched in other action situations within the broader innovation 
system, which is comprised of organizational actors drawn from the university, private and 
public sectors. The actions and decisions taken within the technology transfer sub-system affect 
the dynamics of innovation in these organizations. In turn, the institutional practices and their 
transformations at the individual organizational level affect the functioning of the technology 
transfer partnership. In these partnerships, the actions of participating organizations can therefore 
be thought of as a tree or a lattice with action situations at each node. A particular rule set 
structures the situation at each node. A general set of rules partially structures all internal 
situations and specifies the paths that may be chosen to move from one situation to the next.  
The action arena in technology transfer partnerships can be thought of as composed of a 
series of linked action situations, which can be analyzed simultaneously or under the 
assumptions of ceteris paribus. While in most social interaction situations it is feasible to adopt 
the latter assumption, in knowledge-based innovation systems most action situations undergo 
simultaneous transformations. The IAD framework provides an ideal platform to capture both 
static and dynamic transformations through feedback effects, which in effect have the capacity to 
act as transforming catalysts. In other words, the feedbacks from various nodes in a system have 
the capacity to alter the underlying institutional dynamics of not only a given action arena, for 
example the technology transfer partnership, but the related action arenas in participating 
organizations, such as academia. 
 3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an institutional framework for the analysis of technology 
transfer partnerships. Applying components of the IAD framework can extend an understanding 
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of the underpinnings of the technology transfer process. Even though the framework has not 
been utilized in its entirety, the dynamics of technology transfer partnerships have been laid out 
in a more comprehensive manner than in other studies. The IAD framework enables 
decomposing the innovation system into its constituent sub-systemic parts and analyzes the 
effect of various institutional forces acting on specific sub-systems. One of the key contributions 
of this framework is that it captures not only the superficial interactions between participants and 
their links to the outcomes but it also allows the analyst to delve into the cognitive underpinnings 
of these interactions at the individual level. The cognitive underpinnings are an extremely 
important link to understanding the dynamics of a complex system which are shaped by 
interactions of multiple actors. The next chapter examines various behavioural theories and their 
application in the context of technology transfer partnerships and how they affect the 
institutional structures of these partnerships. 
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Four 
 
Participants in Technology Transfer 
Partnerships:  A Behavioural Analysis 
 
 
Individual participants have a key role to play within any institutional structure. 
Participants within a system act as links between rules, actions, and outcomes. They influence 
the interactions and transformations of various institutional blocks. In the process, individuals are 
also affected by these institutional blocks. In other words, the interactions between institutional 
structures and participants are endogenous. Understanding the behavioural motivations of 
participants becomes even more crucial within technology transfer partnerships, an important 
sub-system of the broader innovation system. Participants in these partnerships come from 
different institutional backgrounds and therefore do not share a common set of mental processes 
with each other. As shown previously, technology transfer partnerships belong to a complex 
innovation system and therefore understanding the mental modes of decision making within such 
systems is even more complicated than in simple social interactions.  
Individual participants act as decision makers under the influence of exogenous variables 
in a system. They animate a system, by linking rules, actions, and outcomes. It is therefore 
imperative to carefully analyze the various cognitive processes that drive participants in a system 
to take certain actions. Such an analysis ought to consider the kind of information participants 
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possess, the relevant preference structure of participants, and the process they use for choosing 
among actions. Key assumptions about information, preferences, and choice mechanisms need to 
be drawn out in order to gain an understanding of the dynamics of an action situation, the 
outcomes, and the interaction between participants, actions, rules, and outcomes.  
This chapter examines the different behavioural forces that affect individual decision 
making processes within a technology transfer partnership. It makes use of some of the core 
literature on behavioural underpinnings of decision making in organizational settings. The 
literature helps identify the impact of behavioural and cognitive capacities on decision making in 
complex systems. The findings from literature are linked to participants in technology transfer 
partnerships, which allow the reader to gain an understanding of cognitive forces at play in these 
partnerships and how they affect the interactions between other components of institutional 
structure.  
In the first part of this chapter, a brief comparative overview of various cognitive theories 
of decision making is presented. The discussion revolves around various assumptions of the 
classical rational choice theory and some of the counter arguments presented in other 
behavioural theories, such as bounded rationality and cognitive framing. Sketching out the 
postulates of these theories helps the reader to view the evolution of behavioural decision making 
theories over time. Then key assumptions regarding participant behaviour from the IAD 
framework are presented in the second section. Finally, these assumptions along with other 
theoretical observations from the literature on decision making are mapped onto technology 
transfer partnerships. The objective of this chapter is to extend an understanding of the impact of 
cognitive capacities of individual participants on technology transfer partnerships.  
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4.1. Theories of Decision Making 
4.1.1. Rational Choice Theory 
Traditionally, the analysis of individual behaviours in social settings has assumed a rational 
choice approach. This approach suggests that individuals act rationally in social interactions 
given certain assumptions about information, valuation, and maximization. Such an approach is 
deeply embedded in classical economic and political thought. The literature in these fields has 
long assumed that individuals act rationally to make transactions in markets, within political 
institutions, and in other fields of life. The assumption is that individuals will maximize their 
utility from any given decision as long as they have access to complete information and they can 
fully evaluate the payoffs of their actions.  
The rational choice theory works well in relatively stable environments where uncertainty 
is low due to historical experiences. In static environments, where the analyst can focus on one 
variable and observe its effects as other variables are held constant, the predictions from rational 
choice are generally reliable. However, in complex and dynamic interactive situations, as is the 
case in knowledge-based economies, the predictive accuracy of the theory falls considerably. In 
complex situations, there is a lot of uncertainty around the nature of interactions and their impact 
on outcomes. In addition, participants have a less than complete grasp on all the pertinent 
information. Furthermore, participants are challenged by inconsistent extrinsic and intrinsic 
evaluations being placed on the payoffs from a given situation. Over the years, experimental 
researchers have shown these inconsistencies undermine the reliability of predictions under 
rational choice. These inconsistencies have led researchers to start considering other behavioural 
models in complex decision making environments.  
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4.1.2. Behavioural Theories of Decision Making—Bounded Rationality  
To account for the inconsistencies of the rational choice theory, scientists have developed 
models which factor in behavioural inconsistencies of individual decision makers. One such 
attempt, formalized by Simon (1955), posits that individuals exhibit “bounded” rationality 
instead of comprehensive rationality. He argues that individuals in complex situations do not 
have the necessary computational skills to be able to fully analyze the information and 
alternatives available to them. Therefore, the main problem is not lack of perfect information or 
alternatives; rather it is a matter of how much cognitive control individuals have over rational 
adaptation.  
It has been argued that individuals usually make certain cognitive calculations about the 
amount of information and the relationship between alternatives and pay-offs. Using these 
calculations, the optimal outcome may involve selection of a certain maximum of an expected 
utility (Simon 1955, 101). In essence, the theory suggests that some of the constraints that 
traditional Rational Choice theory assumes to be environmental may instead be psychological or 
physiological. As Simon has argued, “what we call ‘the environment’ may lie, in part, within the 
skin of the biological organism” (Ibid). These constraints place a boundary on the computational 
capacity which can alter the way rationality is perceived under particular circumstances.  
Bounded rationality also suggests that given psychological constraints, individuals are not 
able to conduct a simultaneous search for information and alternatives; rather alternatives are 
often examined sequentially. In instances where alternatives are examined sequentially, 
individuals may pick the first alternative which satisfies their aspiration level for that problem. 
Aspiration levels in turn are linked with the level of difficulty of finding alternatives. Simon has 
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argued that “as the individual, in his exploration of alternatives, finds it easy to discover 
satisfactory alternatives, his aspiration level rises; as he finds it difficult to discover satisfactory 
alternatives, his aspiration level falls” (Simon 1955, 111). The setting of aspiration targets at a 
cognitive level, therefore, tends to bring about a “near-uniqueness” of the satisfactory solutions. 
The satisfactory solutions, however, may not be located at global optima; rather, they represent 
local maxima, which serve to satisfy the individual.  
Bounded rationality has transformed the mindset of social scientists studying individual 
decisions under complex situations. The concept of bounded rationality has found its way into 
the fields of economics and political science, so much so that many theorists are now reluctant to 
assume comprehensive rationality. Later studies, building on bounded rationality theory, have 
expanded the horizon for understanding cognitive underpinnings of individual behaviour in 
complex situations. Jones (1999) has outlined a number of political and organizational situations 
where decisions are characterized by bounded rationality. It has been argued that the behaviour 
of organizations mimics the bounded rationality of the actors that inhabit them (Jones 1999, 
302). This argument has been extended to studies of various political organizational variables 
such as limited attention spans, habituation and routine, and organizational identification. 
 Further applications of bounded rationality can be found in areas including incremental 
budgeting, electoral behaviour, and organizational habits and routines. In the case of 
organizational learning, the theory suggests that cognitive limits of human decision makers 
constrain the ability of an organization to adjust to its environment. Consequently, learning in 
organizations ends up being a slow, evolutionary, conflictual process, rather than the 
instantaneous process that rational organization theory would imply (Jones 1999, 304). These 
observations from the behavioural theories of decision making provide a great bridging 
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mechanism within the institutional analysis of technology transfer partnerships, as will be 
demonstrated in later sections. 
4.1.3. Behaviour Theories of Decision Making—Prospect Theory  
Beyond bounded rationality theory, one great stride in extending the understanding of 
underlying cognitive processes which govern the participant behaviour in complex systems has 
come from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Their collaboration in studying the cognitive 
limitations of human mind and their impact on decision making culminated in what is now 
famously known as Prospect Theory. The theory, which was first formally presented in 1979, 
sketches an alternative conception of Expected-Utility theory. The theory posits that individuals 
tend to be relatively risk averse in a domain of gains and relatively risk seeking in a domain of 
losses. This argument basically refutes the historically established conception of probability and 
cognitive consistency of preferences. In the process, the theory also challenges the long standing 
axioms of rational modelling of expected utility theory, which include assumptions on 
transitivity, dominance, and invariance of preferences. However, these are only the basic 
propositions of this theory. In order to trace the cognitive roots of bounded rationality, one has to 
dig deeper into the constituent components of the theory. 
In essence, Prospect Theory follows a two-step procedure: the first phase of this procedure 
is known as the editing or framing phase while the second is termed as the evaluation phase. The 
editing phase encompasses what are widely known as framing effects, while the evaluation phase 
involves the decision process of choosing among options. The decision process in this phase is 
further influenced by two processes: perceptual likelihood of the outcomes and assessment of 
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subjective value by using heuristics of judgement. These three processes encapsulate the major 
topics of the work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky. 
In their work, Kahneman and Tversky distinguish between two governing systems which 
operate at the cognitive level—System 1 and System 2. It is believed that System 1 controls the 
decision making process at an intuitive level. The operations of this system are fast, automatic, 
effortless, associative and difficult to control or modify. In contrast, System 2 operations are 
slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also relatively flexible and 
potentially rule-governed (Kahneman 2002, 450). System 1 is therefore responsible for 
governing intuitive judgements, which deal with concepts as well as with perceptions. System 2 
on the other hand is involved in all judgements, whether they originate in impressions or in 
deliberate reasoning. The main task of System 2 is to monitor the quality of both mental 
operations and overt behaviour. Studies have shown that the monitoring activity of System 2 is 
quite lax and allows many intuitive judgments to be expressed, including some that are 
erroneous. These erroneous intuitive judgements are more likely to be expressed under complex 
situations, where individuals are faced with dynamic interactions under time constraints.  
One factor that determines which system governs the decision process in any given 
situation is accessibility. Accessibility has been defined as the ease with which particular mental 
contents come to mind. If a concept is highly accessible, System 1 processes would overrule 
System 2 processes, and the judgment would be made at the intuitive level. For example, 
relational properties are thought to be accessible. It has been suggested that the acquisition of 
skill selectively increases the accessibility of useful responses and of productive ways to 
organize information. Other factors which can affect accessibility include stimulus salience, 
selective attention, and response activation (Kahneman 2002, 453). Kahneman has argued that 
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accessibility reflects “temporary states of priming and associative activation, as well as enduring 
operating characteristics of the perceptual and cognitive systems” (Kahneman 2002, 454). Many 
familiar social categories temporarily increase the accessibility characteristics linked with the 
specific stereotypes within that category, which lowers the threshold for recognizing 
manifestations of these characteristics (Ibid). This suggests that in the absence of a system that 
reliably generates appropriate canonical representations, as when individuals are faced with 
cognitive limitations or bounded rationality, intuitive decisions will be shaped by the factors that 
determine the accessibility of different features of the situation. Features that are highly 
accessible will influence decisions, while features of low accessibility will be largely ignored.  
The core component of Prospect Theory deals with the framing effects, which define the 
editing phase of cognitive processing of a given situation. In their argument on framing effects, 
Kahneman and Tversky have challenged the assumption of rational choice theory which posits 
that preferences are not affected by variations of irrelevant features of options or outcomes. This 
assumption, commonly referred to as extensionality and invariance, is an essential aspect of the 
rational-choice model. However, based on theoretical and experimental evidence, Kahneman and 
Tversky have shown this assumption to be violated due to the framing effects. In essence, 
framing effects evoke different responses when a situation is framed differently. One frequently 
cited example to illuminate this observation is that of the “Asian Disease”3 (Kahneman 2002, 
457). The example highlights the reality that outcomes that are certain are over-weighted relative 
to outcomes of high or intermediate probability (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 280-284). Such 
                                                           
3
 Asian Disease refers to an experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky during their study of framing effects. 
The study highlights how individuals react to two different programs when the perception of both programs differs 
in terms of their capacity to prevent losses or to allow gains. 
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assignment of differential weighting to the same events challenges the notion of invariance, 
which in turn puts into question the soundness of rational choice models.  
The second process which defines Prospect Theory constitutes perceptual likelihood of the 
outcomes. It has been argued that perception is reference-dependent. A contrast between the 
focal stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli determines the perceived attributes 
of the focal stimulus. Kahneman and Tversky have argued that dependence on reference frames 
to perceive a specific focal stimulus also shows through decision making. In other words, the 
evaluation of decision outcomes is thought to be reference dependent. Such a notion of reference 
dependence counters the postulates of Expected Utility Theory, which is in essence reference 
independent. Expected Utility Theory assumes that the value that is assigned to a given state of 
wealth does not vary with the decision maker’s initial state of wealth. Khanmean and Tversky 
have challenged this assumption by suggesting that the effective stimulus is not the new level of 
stimulation; rather it is the difference between the stimulus itself and the existing adaptation level 
(Kahneman 2002, 261). 
The notion of reference dependence in perceiving outcomes has also been proven 
experimentally. The experimental evidence has shown that in cases involving gambles with 
options to win and lose with different outcome values, most people will reject a gamble with 
even chances to win and lose, unless the possible win is at least twice the size of the possible loss 
(Tversky and Kahneman (1992) quoted in Kahneman 2002, 452). Such abrupt transition from 
risk aversion to risk seeking and vice versa, the authors of this theory argue, could not plausibly 
be explained by a utility function for wealth. Preferences appear to be determined by attitudes to 
gains and losses, which are defined relative to a reference point. Prospect Theory therefore 
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presents an alternative to the rational choice model of risk perception by embracing the idea that 
preferences are reference-dependent. 
To capture the reference dependence of preferences, Kahneman and Tversky have 
proposed a value function, which is defined in the domains of gains and losses. The function is 
thought to be concave in the domain of gains, favouring risk aversion and convex in the domain 
of loses, favouring risk seeking. The most important feature of this value function is that it is 
sharply kinked at the reference point and assumes loss-aversion. In other words, the function is 
steeper for losses than for gains by a factor of 2-2.5 (Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1991) 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), quoted in Kahneman 2002, 462). Several studies since the 
presentation of this representation of risk framing have confirmed that the functions in the two 
domains are fairly well-approximated by power functions with similar exponents, both less than 
unity (Swalm (1966) & Tversky & Kahneman (1992), quoted in Kahneman 2002, 462). These 
findings therefore provide an important step in the understanding of utility maximization and risk 
perception in that the value function reflects an anticipation of the valence and intensity of the 
emotions that are experienced at moments of transition from one state to another. It suggests that 
utility cannot be separately assessed from emotional charges.  
The third process which Kahneman and Tversky, as well as other behavioural scientists, 
consider to affect the decision making process is assessment of subjective value by using 
heuristics of judgement. Heuristics are described at various times as principles, as processes, or 
as sources of cues for judgement (Kahneman 2002, 466). Kahneman and Frederick (2002) have 
extended the definition of a generic heuristic process which is termed as attribute substitution. In 
such a process, “a judgement is said to be mediated by a heuristic when the individual assesses a 
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting a related heuristic attribute that 
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comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman and Frederick (2002), quoted in Kahneman 2002, 466). 
It has been shown through experimental evidence “that people rely on a limited number of 
heuristic principles which reduce complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values 
to simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 3-20). The use of heuristics, it 
has been argued, can significantly bias the judgement process and result in erroneous predictions 
about outcomes.  
Since the inception of research in the area of heuristics, scientists have developed an 
extensive list of heuristics which affect the judgemental process. Prospect Theory, however, 
relies on three major heuristics thought to affect the judgment process--representativeness, 
availability and anchoring. These heuristics are believed to induce various systematic biases in 
the decision-making process, including non-regressive prediction, neglect of base-rate 
information, overconfidence, and overestimates of the frequency of events that are easy to recall. 
The theory also extends the concept of heuristics beyond the domain of judgement about 
uncertain events and proposes an explicit treatment of the conditions under which intuitive 
judgements can be modified or overridden by the monitoring operations associated with System 
2 (Kahneman 2002, 465-466). Therefore, an analysis of the function of heuristics in the decision 
making process ties the entire cognitive process underlying decision making to the outcomes. 
It has been argued that use of heuristics is not the main problem when it comes to 
analyzing erroneous decisions; rather it is the fact that individuals relying on these heuristics are 
unaware of the substitutions they make at the cognitive level. Since the cognitive illusions that 
are produced by attribute substitutions have the same character, the individual mapping the 
attribute onto the scale of another is unaware of this substitution. Kahneman has hypothesized 
that this could be related to the functioning of System 1 and System 2 which control the intuitive 
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and controlled cognitive processes. The implication of this assumption is that errors of intuitive 
judgement could involve both systems: System 1, which generated the error, and System 2 which 
failed to correct it. Since System 2 is involved in monitoring all decisions, voluntary or intuitive, 
there could be two possible outcomes of the intervention of System 2. The intuitive judgement, 
which may be based on a heuristic, may be adjusted or rejected and replaced by another 
conclusion. However, the intuitive impression is still likely to be prevalent as it precedes the 
statistical calculation and therefore, more likely to serve as an anchor for subsequent adjustment. 
This implies that even adjustments will prove insufficient in correcting the erroneous mapping of 
attribute mapping onto the original stimulus.  
The conclusions derived from Prospect Theory have proven to be ground breaking in 
understanding the cognitive processes underlying individual decision making. They have 
challenged the long standing assumptions of rational choice, expected utility and many more 
theories which had long informed the analysis of decision making in social interaction settings. 
The findings of this theory regarding framing effects, perceptual valuation of outcomes, and use 
of heuristics in producing erroneous judgements can greatly inform this particular analysis, 
which involves individuals responsible for decision making under complex, dynamic and 
uncertain conditions.  
4.2. Behavioural assumptions of the IAD framework 
The IAD framework assigns a critical weighting to the behavioural assumption of 
participants within an action situation. The framework establishes key assumptions about 
cognitive underpinnings of participant behaviour that are used to “animate” the institutional 
setup. The variables which are considered important in informing participant behaviour include 
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information processing, preferences, and choice mechanisms. One key characteristic of the 
framework is that instead of using the comprehensive rationality model for predicting participant 
behaviour, it makes use of the more sophisticated theories such as bounded rationality and 
prospect theory. It also relies on more advanced explanations of individual learning processes, 
which can prove challenging under complex and uncertain decision making environments. Let us 
now focus our attention on those cognitive assumptions which hold the key to explaining 
individual participant behaviour in an action situation. 
4.2.1. Information 
Assumptions about information gathering and processing are deemed critically important 
within the IAD framework. The framework recognizes that most complex social interaction 
situations face the challenge of imperfect and/or incomplete information. In such situations, a 
participant may be faced with the prospect of asymmetric information. The framework posits that 
“when other-regarding preferences and/or intrinsic values are assigned to outcomes and actions, 
the situation is one of incomplete, rather than complete, information because other players 
cannot know exactly how an individual is valuing these actions and outcomes” (Ostrom 2005, 
102). Incomplete and imperfect information can bias the analysis in systems comprising dynamic 
interactions between the participants.  
One characteristic of the IAD framework which makes it distinctive from other 
institutional frameworks is that it allows the analyst to choose the focal level and consequently 
the appropriate behavioural assumptions within a particular action situation. For example, if the 
focus of analysis is on stable and repetitive situations where intrinsic values are important, then 
one can retain the assumption of full information about the structure of the situation. In most 
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complex and uncertain situations, however, participants are faced with cognitive limitations 
which can hamper their capability to search for information and analyze it in a comprehensively 
rational manner. In most complex situations, as Simon (1955) and other behavioural theorists 
have posited, the available information may greatly exceed the competence of an individual to 
compute a solution based on fuller analysis (Heiner 1983 quoted in Ostrom 2005, 102). 
To capture the process through which participants gather and process information, the IAD 
framework sketches out a comprehensive map of mental models through which information 
search and processing is related to actions and outcomes. It has been argued that individuals 
attempt to create a mental model or a representation of diverse situations so as to be able to make 
reasonable decisions in these multiple settings. The argument also suggests that mental models 
are affected by feedbacks from the world and the shared culture or belief system in which 
individuals are operating (Ostrom 2005, 105). 
The process of information search suggests that within an action situation, participants 
receive information about the structure of the situations. Participants then design an appropriate 
model of the situation through repeated interactions in it or similar structures, or they can rely on 
earlier mental models formed of that particular situation if they have dealt with the situation 
previously. The information search process is thus affected by the historical outcomes that have 
been previously experienced within an action situation. In addition to historical experiences, the 
mental models are also affected by cultural belief systems. Cultural belief systems are in turn 
affected by exogenous variables acting upon the action situation. In the presence of rules and 
shared cultural beliefs, the diversity of mental models that individuals hold within an action 
situation is said to be reduced to a smaller set. Therefore, the shared experiences and belief 
systems can reinforce the mental models used by the participants in a given action situation.  
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An extension of this argument suggests that in relatively stable and repetitive situations, 
individual participants will converge to a common mental model of information search, 
processing, and decision making. This assumption, however, emerges from the rational choice 
school and may not hold in complex dynamic situations with a large number of participants. In 
these situations, participants may or may not be able to interact with each other at frequent 
intervals. Challenged with cognitive limitations and faced with incomplete information, 
individual participants may make errors in perception, in their comprehension of how a complex 
structure works, or simply in computations (Vincent Ostrom 1986 and 1997 quoted in Ostrom 
2005, 106). 
Various behavioural theories have suggested that situations experienced by individual 
participants are interpreted differently by these individuals. In addition, the response time to an 
information signal also varies across individuals. Disproportionate information processing 
implies that a direct link between inputs and outputs cannot be established. The gap between 
inputs and outputs gives rise to an imperfect match between the adaptive strategies participants 
may devise and the information they receive. In this case, understanding the common 
behavioural patterns of decision making in an action situation could prove extremely 
challenging. To counter these challenges, Ostrom has highlighted Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s 
findings related to environmental factors which affect the perception of participants about a 
particular action situation. These properties are referred to as salience and vividness of the action 
situation. Salience is defined as “the degree to which an element is linked to possible changes in 
the welfare of the decision maker,” while vividness refers to the “amount and quality of the 
sensory details of the objects encountered” (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 2001, quoted in Ostrom 
2005, 107). Ostrom argues that these variables are important in gaining attention given the 
  
variety of signals an individual receives. As a result, these variables can inform the analysis as to 
which information will be received and retained as well as how that information will be
processed by the participant. 
Fig. 4.1: Impact of communication, vividness, and salience on the relationship 
between information, action-
Source: Ostrom 2005, 108. 
 
4.2.2. Valuation 
Much of traditional thought on individual behaviours in social interaction settings has 
assumed that individuals in a situation assign consistent external valuations to payoffs. Another 
assumption usually made in the classical rational choice framework is 
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concerned about maximizing their own utility. These assumptions, yet again, are shown to be 
deficient in complex dynamic situations with multiple participants. It has been shown that the 
preferences of individuals in such situations are not only concerned about the extrinsic 
valuation–intrinsic valuation also plays a critical role in determining the overall valuation of an 
outcome or a payoff. 
It has been argued that intrinsic valuation of preferences can partially dictate the preferred 
behaviour of participants in regards to themselves and others in an action situation. The intrinsic 
valuation is in turn affected by the sense of self-determination and self-esteem. Ostrom argues 
that positive intrinsic motivation is increased when individuals feel that their own self-
determination or self-esteem is enhanced. This implies that intrinsic motivation can be “crowded 
out” in situations where individuals do not perceive they have sufficient self-control over their 
actions (Ostrom 2005, 112).  
There are two possible avenues through which the level of intrinsic motivation can be 
affected. First, external interventions can crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individuals 
affected perceive them to be controlling. In that case, both self-determination and self-esteem 
suffer, and individuals react by reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled. 
Second, external interventions can crowd-in intrinsic motivation if the individuals concerned 
perceive it as supportive. In that case, self-esteem is fostered, and the individuals feel that they 
are given more freedom to act, which enlarges self-determination. Based on these observations, 
one can conclude that individuals not only differ in their mental models but they may also differ 
in regard to their internal valuation patterns. These internal valuations may inform the extent 
they take others into account in the decisions they make and the intrinsic valuation they may 
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place on taking particular types of actions or reaching particular types of outcomes (Ostrom 
2005, 113). 
4.3. Technology Transfer Partnerships: Behavioural Analysis of 
Participants 
The theories of cognitive underpinnings of individual behaviour can be used to predict the 
behaviour of participants within technology transfer partnerships. In addition to bounded 
rationality and prospect theory, further insights can be gained through other areas where 
cognitive and behavioural theories of decision making have been previously applied. One such 
area is entrepreneurship. Studies on entrepreneurship can prove instructive as technology transfer 
partnerships encapsulate structures which closely resemble action situations in these areas.  
Technology partnerships are developed to promote technology transfer and 
commercialization through collaboration between the university, public sector, and private firms. 
These partnerships are comprised of individuals who come together from different organizational 
backgrounds. Therefore, it is an interesting proposition to analyze how these individuals manage 
complex interactions, search for information, process the information at the cognitive level, and 
make decisions in these complex situations. The literature suggests that each individual has a 
different set of cognitive processes to reach a decision. Moreover, membership of different 
organizational backgrounds and a variety of institutional rules diversifies the cognitive models 
employed by individuals participating in a partnership. Examining how individuals deal with this 
cognitive diversity in a complex situation makes for an interesting inquiry, and an understanding 
of the cognitive phenomena at work within these partnerships highlights the complexity within 
such partnerships, at both organizational and individual levels. 
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The first step in technology transfer partnerships consists of information search, which is 
comprised of multiple layers. This information search process first involves searching for 
appropriate partners who have the necessary capabilities to promote technology transfer and 
commercialization. To make an account of the varied organizational and institutional capital that 
these individuals would contribute to commercialization requires an extensive search process. 
Often the primary proponent of a partnership is required to conduct this search and get all the 
organizations and their representatives at the table. The proponent, therefore, is responsible for 
liaising among these organizational spheres in order to gather all the pertinent information. 
Gathering information regarding each partner’s institutional and individual capacities is a 
daunting task. The person in charge of gathering this information may be faced with the prospect 
of incomplete and asymmetric information. Assuming that those involved with this aspect of 
information search would utilize comprehensive rationality could lead to faulty assumptions. 
There is always uncertainty about the exact capacities of potential partners, especially private 
sector firms where secrecy abounds. In addition, proponents usually face a serious time 
constraint which can hamper the cognitive calculations that need to be conducted at the 
individual level. In such complex situations, it is impossible for the individual to 
comprehensively analyze all the information available and make accurate and infallible 
judgements.  
One key impediment to developing a technology transfer partnership is the unfavourable 
perception that participants may hold towards each other. Due to lack of common cultural values, 
as well as divergent cognitive models, participants often hold differing opinions about each other 
and expectations of each motive in pursuing a partnership. It can be argued that there is a win-
loss mindset among the participants towards each other. The ultimate goal of commercializing 
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technology and its payoffs could be viewed as losses at the individual level. An individual 
participant may feel that other participants may stand to gain more through the 
commercialization and transfer activity. Such feelings of potential loss may trigger a participant 
to employ cognitive heuristics, which would eventually lead the participant to undertake riskier 
actions. Consequently, such decisions under the cloud of uncertainty can lead to unanticipated 
outcomes, which in turn could dent the efficiency and credibility of the entire collaborative 
technology transfer organization.  
Individuals who belong to different organizational spheres also need to decide whether or 
not they want to join a partnership. These decisions could be informed by multiple cognitive 
processes. Individuals could be influenced by the extrinsic and intrinsic valuations they place on 
the outcomes that may be achieved through the technology transfer partnership and 
commercialization activities. Researchers who are responsible for developing an innovation may 
be influenced by the extrinsic valuation of payoffs associated with commercializing that 
technology. If, for example, the payoffs are large enough and visible through processes such as 
promotion and higher salaries, an individual might be extrinsically motivated to engage in these 
activities. If the intrinsic valuation of factors such as reputation, credibility, and informal 
recognition are also favourable, that may reinforce the extrinsic motivation. Individuals may also 
place contradicting valuations on these accounts, which in turn might determine the overall 
motivation to participate in the partnership. 
Once the dimensions of various partners have been established, the next most important 
step in a partnership is to establish the scope of the effort (e.g. the technologies to be transferred 
or commercialized). This is probably the most cognitively complex process that participants in a 
technology transfer process undertake. Once a technology is developed in a university or public 
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lab, technology transfer personnel are usually responsible for establishing a list of potentially 
viable uses. In consultation with private sector partners and the faculty involved in the 
development of a particular technology, the technology transfer officers are responsible for 
determining whether or not the technology has commercial value. The choices of technology and 
the avenue chosen to commercialize the technology trigger the cognitive processes outlined in 
previous sections. 
The viability of a technology in commercial markets is at best uncertain at the time when 
key decisions regarding its commercialization are made. It could prove a risky venture if it fails 
to take off in the market. Prospect Theory informs us that when faced with a probabilistic choice, 
the ultimate decision is dependent on the reference frame as well as on the perceptual outcomes 
involved. If the individuals are in the domain of gains, they would be risk averse and choose the 
more certain outcome. On the other hand, if they are in the domain of loss, they would choose 
the riskier option. What this means for the technology transfer activity is that, given the risky 
nature of commercialization, if the participants in a technology transfer partnership are in the 
domain of gains, they will opt for a commercialization pathway that has at least twice the 
chances of success in the markets as compared to failure. The domain in this case could be 
determined through historical experiences and projections, as well as through the heuristics 
discussed previously. If past experiences with commercialization of similar technologies are 
perceived as a loss, participants will most likely be in a domain of loss and will eventually 
choose a riskier mode of commercialization. This might lead to inappropriate technologies being 
chosen and lead to further inefficiencies in commercialization of innovative technologies in the 
future.  
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Participants in a technology transfer partnership are faced with several viable strategies of 
commercialization, including licensing, creation of a spin-off, and venture formation. When 
faced with a choice between these options, the participants face similar cognitive challenges. 
Based on the risk framing of the prospective outcomes, participants may opt for an option with 
more certain outcomes in terms of payoffs or choose the riskier option. If the participants are in a 
frame of gains and do not want to undertake much risk, the safer option is licensing. Licensing 
therefore reflects a sense of risk-averseness on part of the participants responsible for 
commercializing a technology. Looking at the avenue chosen for commercialization may 
therefore, be quite instructive in understanding the mindset of the participants and their position 
in either the domain of gains or losses. 
The choice of commercialization avenues may also provide an insight into the search 
process that participants have undertaken. If participants are operating under cognitive 
constraints and time pressures, they may not be able to undertake a comprehensive search for 
possible alternatives. In such cases, the participants may choose for an option that satisfies the 
minimum criteria. As a result, the choice may not be as profitable or economically beneficial as 
other available options. 
One key group of participants in the technology transfer partnerships are entrepreneurs. 
The literature on cognitive underpinnings of entrepreneurship could provide a few insights in this 
case (see Forbes 2005; Busenitz and Barney 1997; Baron 2004; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001; 
and Simon, Houghton, and Aquino 1999). Scholars studying the behavioural patterns of 
entrepreneurs in forming new start-ups have observed that these entrepreneurs are often located 
in a domain of loss. In addition, they are often found to rely on judgement heuristics, which 
allows them to make decisions quickly (Busenitz and Barney 1997, 11). Entrepreneurs are also 
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prone to having an overconfidence bias (Forbes 2005). These cognitive processes are deemed an 
essential component of the entrepreneurial ethos. Entrepreneurs are required to make judgements 
about the commercial viability of a product and possible avenues of exploitation under extreme 
time constraints and uncertainty (Buseniz and Barney 1997, 13-15). At the same time, however, 
these limitations can induce serious biases in the judgement process and expose the entrepreneur 
to flawed decisions. 
4.4. Conclusions: 
The participants in a technology transfer partnership, just like in any other institutional 
structure, are faced with cognitive limitations which may affect their decision making. The 
literature on behavioural decision making informs the analysis of participant behaviour in 
complex institutional situations. Behavioural theories such as bounded rationality and Prospect 
Theory are frequently employed to gain an understanding of participant behaviour. These 
theories suggest that individuals are unable to exercise complete rationality under complex 
situations, and their decisions reflect bounded rationality. The extension of this argument, as 
presented in both these theories, suggests that individuals cannot rationally analyze the available 
information and rely on heuristics to judge a given stimulus. Furthermore, decisions are 
dependent on frames of reference--individuals invoke different judgements based on whether 
they perceive the outcomes in a domain of losses or gains. 
These findings from the behavioural theories can also be applied to the participants in 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships, a sub-system of the broader innovation 
system. The participants in these partnerships are faced with similar cognitive limitations and as 
a result end up making flawed judgements under complex situations. Their capacity to make 
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judgements about participation in a partnership, the commercial viability of certain technologies, 
and possible avenues to be used in the exploitation of that technology are in most instances 
biased due to their cognitive limitations. However, these cognitive incapacities do not act alone 
in the decision making process. They are coupled with other exogenous institutional variables 
such as rules, community attributes, and biophysical conditions, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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Five 
 
Saskatoon Agriculture Biotechnology 
Cluster: A Case Study on Technology 
Transfer and Commercialization 
 
 
Building upon the institutional and behavioural framework established in the previous two 
chapters, this chapter presents a case study to test some of the theoretical postulates of the 
framework. The previous two chapters have provided ample theoretical foundation to analyze the 
applicability of the framework in real situations. In order to test the theoretical postulates, a case 
study on Saskatoon’s agriculture biotechnology cluster is developed. The case study analyzes 
recent attempts to develop technology transfer and commercialization partnerships between 
university, public, and private sector organizations. More specifically, it highlights the efforts to 
develop an overarching organization known as the Bio-economy Center of Commercialization 
and Research (BECCR). In order to develop the case, interviews were conducted with key 
organizational actors who were involved during the proposal development stages of the 
initiative. A study of the BECCR initiative along with a general overview of technology transfer 
and commercialization initiatives in Saskatoon cluster highlight some of the barriers in the 
development of technology transfer partnerships. More importantly, it allows the reader to 
understand the important role played by institutional structures and behavioural frames in the 
development of these partnerships.  
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The chapter begins with an overview of the state of technology transfer and 
commercialization activities in Canada, providing the reader with the necessary background in 
order to be able to understand the issue from a broader national context. It then briefly describes 
the attempts to develop technology transfer and commercialization in the Saskatoon cluster, 
including the BECCR initiative. Following these descriptions, the methodology and findings 
section presents the key areas that were explored during the interviews with key stakeholders of 
the BECCR project and the observations emerging from these interviews. These observations are 
then analyzed, linking the findings with the key theoretical postulates of the institutional and 
behavioural framework established in earlier chapters. 
5.1. State of Technology Transfer and Commercialization in Canada 
In a global economy, the contributions of a strong research and development (R&D) 
system towards achieving long-term economic growth and national prosperity cannot be ignored. 
Both in Canada and internationally, R&D and innovation are looked upon as central drivers of 
economic growth instead of as mere components of countries’ national competitiveness 
strategies. There is a global consensus, reflected in  most strategies on R&D and innovation, that 
universities play a critical role in national innovation systems, both as performers of basic and 
applied research and as providers of highly qualified personnel (HQP) for all sectors 
(Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 3). Governments in OECD countries 
have increasingly focused on partnering with both universities and industry in their quest to 
promote innovation in the fields of science and technology. Collaboration and partnerships have 
become features in nearly all national R&D strategies (Association of Universities and Colleges 
of Canada 2008, 5). With an increased focus on public-private partnerships as a strategy for 
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promoting innovation and knowledge transfer, the expectations from academia have also 
increased.  
Part of this process has also been driven by the growing complexity and costs of research. 
Some assert the research enterprise has become too large and complex to be managed by any one 
organization. Moreover, technological advances have created expectations that an increasingly 
wide range of problems can be researched and addressed in a more holistic fashion and at an 
accelerated pace. This adds to the expectations of knowledge mobilization and comprehensive 
applications of research. As a result, governments and academia increasingly view enhanced 
R&D collaboration as a necessary means to achieve economies of scale, address productivity 
gaps, strengthen knowledge mobilization and commercialization, and improve the overall well-
being of the citizenry (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada 2008, 4). This 
strategy is particularly important in Canada, which is a relatively small player in the global 
economy and where some argue both the public and private sectors do not have the capacity to 
carry out all the functions associated with a knowledge economy. This is at least partly reflected 
in the large share of R&D performed in the public sector and in universities and the relatively 
poor performance of the private sector. Consequently, governments have made it a priority for 
public sector researchers as well as academia to collaborate with the private sector to ensure that 
knowledge generated in these organizations can be translated into economic growth. 
The increased focus on public-private collaboration is partly the result of the structure of 
Canada's R&D effort. . The AUCC reports that in 2007 approximately $29 billion was invested 
in research in Canada, a modest overall increase of only 4.5 percent since 1992. By 2008, the 
OECD and the Canadian academies confirmed that the public sector has moved into the top five 
nations in terms of its basic research activities and outputs. The biggest concern of many is that 
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the private sector in Canada contributes only modestly to R&D investment. Canada relies 
relatively heavily on research in universities and public research facilities. Hence, it is 
particularly important for Canada to figure out how to efficiently and effectively commercialize 
technology and products from public institutions (Association of Universities and Colleges of 
Canada 2008, 1).  
There is corroborating evidence that while Canada has a strong potential for basic research, 
both public and private Canadian institutions have not been able to tap into this potential, often 
failing to translate basic research into marketable, commercially viable innovative technologies. 
In 2003, for example, the revenue received by the 121 organizations from commercialized IP 
was C$55.5 million only. While this figure may sound large in absolute terms, when translated 
into net return on investment it represents a scant 0.44% net return (Smyth 2006, 5). This paints a 
rather bleak picture of technology transfer and commercialization activities in Canada.   
One possible explanation for this weak performance is Canada's inability to construct 
institutions that can effectively translate basic and applied research from public labs and 
universities into the private sector. The rest of this thesis examines one attempt to construct such 
an institution and assesses the reasons for its failure. 
5.2. The Saskatoon Agriculture Biotechnology Cluster 
The Saskatoon-based agricultural biotechnology cluster is one of the most advanced and 
one of the few dedicated agriculture biotechnology clusters in the country. While the cluster may 
have developed a profitable niche in agriculture biotechnologies, Saskatchewan trails other 
clusters in terms of firms, revenues, R&D investment, and number of employees.  
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Dobni and Phillips (2001) have suggested that the source population for the Saskatoon 
cluster is roughly comprised of 110 actors. Of these, public research institutions (universities, 
government research labs) represent the greatest portion of the source population (35%) followed 
by private sector firms (34%), development and non-profit coordinating organizations (9%), and 
government entities (7%) (Dobni and Phillips 2001 quoted in Phillips et al. 2008, 243). In 
another study, Phillips et al. (2005) suggested that the most important of these organizations can 
be organized based on their density and centrality within the cluster (Phillips et al. 2005, 70). 
Based on these density and centrality measures, the authors have argued that University of 
Saskatchewan (UofS), National Research Council’s Plant Biotechnology Institute (NRC-PBI) 
and Industrial Research Assistance Program (NRC-IRAP) are the central actors for R&D 
activity. NRC-IRAP was found to be the central actor in services and financial exchanges as well 
as high-quality personnel exchange and networking activities. Saskatchewan Research Council 
(SRC) and Ag-West Bio (AWB) were found to be main actors in these activities along with 
NRC-IRAP (Phillips et al. 2005, 74). It is interesting to note that the study did not find any 
private sector organization to be playing a central role within the cluster. All of the organizations 
listed were public, quasi-public, or collective organizations. Despite the presence of many well 
established and well connected organizations with competencies in many different areas of 
innovation, the commercial potential of technologies developed by these organizations has 
remained largely unrealized. These organizations provide a strong public sector research 
capacity, but their performance with commercialization and technology transfer has been 
deficient. There remains a gap between research and economic capacities. There is a strong 
realization at the governmental levels as well as within academia that action needs to be taken in 
order to fill this void.  
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From a historical perspective, various efforts have been undertaken in the Saskatoon-based 
Ag-biotech cluster in order to establish partnerships between academia, public, and private 
sectors. Most of these efforts have been concentrated around niche areas related to canola and 
pulses. In both these cases, actors from academia and the public and private sectors have played 
an active role at various stages including research, development, and marketing.  
In the case of canola, Phillips (2001) has argued that since the inception of research efforts 
in this field, there has been a change of direction in collaborative activities (Phillips and 
Khachatourians 2001, 58). It has been suggested that the leadership role in the field of canola has 
evolved from public-based organizations to private sector corporations. In a sense, the leadership 
role has moved in patterns between 1944-1966, 1967-1973, 1974-1989 and 1990-1998 (Phillips 
and Khachatourians 2001, 65). These shifts were representative of attempts to fix various 
perceived or actual imperfections in the underlying dynamics of the canola value chain.  
Despite these evolving patterns of leadership, the overall collaborative activity between 
academia, public, and private sector had remained focussed on the a strictly defined objective of 
developing and marketing double-zero rapeseed (what was ultimately named canola). The 
initiative was supported by a tightly knit community comprising public sector plant scientists and 
chemists from AAFC, the NRC, and a number of universities, with only a small amount of effort 
by a few selected Canadian companies. The community was also supplemented and supported by 
various farmer-led commodity groups. The state acted as a low-key facilitator and leader since 
the inception of the initiative. It also provided consistent and flexible funding and oversaw an 
open regime of IP policies. It can be argued that active public sector leadership led to the 
successful development and adoption of canola in 1960-78 periods and also provided for the 
right market conditions for the private sector to smoothly takeover the leadership role in the 90s.   
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The second wave of innovation related to canola saw efforts concentrated on development 
of more advanced commercially-oriented herbicide-tolerant varieties. This initiative was 
undertaken between 1980 and the late 1990s and built upon the earlier Saskatoon-based efforts to 
develop and adopt the original canola varieties. The introduction of private research into the 
canola industry after 1985 caused the seed business to significantly change (Phillips 2002, 4). As 
a result of this transformation in leadership roles, the private sector now controlled the majority 
of the research and commercialization process. Public entities played more of a supplemental 
role by engaging in partnerships with the private sector and providing support in the form of star 
researchers, public research facilities and research funding through tax credits and subsidies. The 
system was increasingly defined by a strict commercial focus which entailed exploitation of 
Canadian and global markets, development of commercially-funded research enterprises, and 
rigid IP structures. The initiative can be considered an overall success based on the data on the 
growth in herbicide tolerant canola acreage as well as a net cost-benefit analysis (Phillips 2002). 
Phillips estimates that the large capital investments were recouped within 5-7 years of product 
introduction, which justifies the decision to develop the technology (Phillips 2002, 16). 
Nevertheless, this success should be carefully qualified in the light of uneven gains across 
farmers, innovators, producers, and consumers (ibid).  
In addition to canola development and commercialization, the Saskatoon cluster has also 
maintained a strong focus on innovation in pulses. The cluster has been responsible in 
developing and disseminating numerous varieties of pulses across the globe. These efforts to 
produce and adopt new varieties of pulses have also largely taken a collaborative form between a 
diverse range of actors from various public, private, community-based and academic 
organizations.   
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Partnerships have played a significant role in the production and adoption of new pulse 
varieties. In this regard, partnerships between the Crop Development Corporation (CDC), a 
University of Saskatchewan based entity, and the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG) can be 
considered an example of well-functioning partnership that is used as an exemplar across the 
cluster. A recent study by Ryan, Phillips, and Boland (2011) found the CDC-SPG partnership to 
be a unique case in that it is the top ranked actor and a highly connected gatekeeper controlling 
the flow of new information into and across a global research network.  
More recently, the University of Saskatchewan undertook an initiative in 2007-8 to create a 
new technology transfer partnership in an attempt to consolidate the cluster’s commercialization 
activities and re-invigorate public sector leadership in the cluster. The initiative, led by a few key 
researchers in the College of Agriculture, was driven in part by a funding opportunity. The 
National Centers of Excellence (NCE), a federal government funding program designed to 
promote commercialization and research, issued a call for centres of excellence for 
commercialization and research (CECR). The driving idea behind the effort in Saskatoon, named 
The Bio-Economy Center of Commercialization and Research (BECCR), was:  
to establish an innovative demand-pull entrepreneurial business/multi-institution research 
partnership with proven economic impact in bridging the industry/research 
commercialization gap through novel approaches to technology commercialization, wealth 
creation and skill development (Isaac 2008, 2).  
The proposed center was a response to the pressing need for synchronizing commercialization 
activities within the cluster and among the leading public and university research units. It was 
envisioned that such a center would act as an anchor to the regional innovation cluster. Through 
this center, the lead actors planned to bring together the main organizations in the cluster 
including: the University of Saskatchewan (UofS) (especially the College of Agriculture); 
  
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC); 
Biotechnology Institute (NRC-PBI); Saskatchewan Research Council (SRC); Canadian Light
Source-Synchrotron (CLSI); Protein, Oil, and Starch (POS)
Institute (FII); Ag-West Bio (AWB); and Innovation Place Bio Processing Center (IPBPC)
center would draw upon the strengths of all of the stakeholders in the clus
economic development. By bringing these organizations together, it was argued, the center 
would enable the private sector to identify problems, needs and challenges, and then draw upon 
the research capacity of the partnering organizations t
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envisioned as the cluster anchor which would horizontally bridge each of the distinct pillars of 
capacity within the cluster (Ibid).  
The main goal of this partnership, as outlined in the proposal, was to bridge between major 
research organizations “to provide a seamless management of intellectual property, research 
contracts and projects which will provide much improved research efficiency and 
commercialization for the private sector” (Isaac 2008, 4). Furthermore, it was argued that such a 
center would facilitate the creation of public-private partnerships, engage industry throughout the 
innovation cycle, and improve risk management and research productivity. Consequently, the 
proposal indicated a strong emphasis on supporting entrepreneurial activities and assisting small 
and medium sized business and large industries (Ibid).  
The proposed center, however, failed to materialize after an unsuccessful attempt to secure 
NCE funding. The idea has been discussed extensively within the cluster and it provides a good 
starting point to understand some of the institutional and behavioural factors that have been 
postulated as critical in determining the successful development of such technology transfer and 
commercialization partnerships. In the following sections, we develop a case study to 
demonstrate how various institutional and behavioural factors had (negatively) influenced the 
development of this particular project. The case study also helps us distinguish between the more 
successful partnerships that have been established to develop and commercialize varieties of 
canola and pulses.  
5.3. Methodology and Findings 
To capture the underlying dynamics of developing technology transfer and 
commercialization partnerships between the three organizational spheres, open ended, in-person 
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interviews were conducted with 15 key individuals who were involved with the BECCR 
initiative as well as other such initiatives in Saskatoon. These individuals are affiliated with 
various organizations in the Saskatoon cluster including University of Saskatchewan, NRC, Ag-
West Bio, CLS, and various others. The survey design and method was assessed by the 
University of Saskatchewan Behaviour Research Ethics Board (Certificate of Approval BEH # 
09-256), which can be found in the appendix). 
The main expectation from these interviews was that they would offer a test of the 
theoretical postulates of the framework developed in previous chapters. Therefore, the questions 
were developed to capture and analyze the institutional and behavioural underpinnings that affect 
the development of technology transfer and commercialization partnerships, specifically the 
BECCR initiative. Table 5.1 provides the list of questions participants were asked during the 
interviews.  
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Table 5.1.  List of interview questions 
1. Describe the process that was undertaken to develop the BECCR initiative? 
 
2. What goals did you expect to achieve through the use of this particular partnership? 
 
3. What was the role of your specific organization within this proposed partnership? 
 
4. What were your individual responsibilities within your organization in regards to this 
partnership? 
 
5. In your view, what are some key factors that are required to develop a partnership like this 
one? 
 
6. What were some of the strategies or channels that were used in the efforts to develop this 
partnership? 
 
7. What were some of the impediments to creating this specific partnership? 
 
8. Does the rhetoric of common interest between the parties mask important differences of value 
and motivation? 
 
9. What role did the individual faculty members play in this process? 
 
10. Are there lessons to be learned, which can also be generalized to other cases? 
 
 
These open-ended questions were only used as guides for the discussion and were not 
always presented to the interviewees in the same order. While the responses to questions related 
to institutional factors provided more direct insights, those corresponding to behavioural factors 
provided a bit of a challenge. These responses only indirectly reflected on the cognitive domains 
of individuals. Therefore, we had to look out for key terms used by individuals as an indicator of 
their relative cognitive domain at the point of decision making during the initiative. In our 
presentation of these findings, we have developed a list of descriptors which allow us to 
distinguish between cognitive domains.  These descriptors are presented in table 5.2, with more 
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detailed descriptions of these presented in section 5.4.2. We also highlight the key words which 
were used by the respondents to stress a certain position by putting them in quotations ‘’. 
Table 5.2.  Descriptors of Cognitive Domains of Gains and Losses 
Domain of Gains Indicators Domain of Losses Indicators 
View cluster as performing well Concerns about the loss in the leadership 
position of the cluster 
 
Organizational success with commercialization Past failures in commercialization 
experience 
 
New discoveries Sense of urgency 
 
Personal career success Entrepreneurialism 
 
Source: Author. 
The interviews yielded some very interesting (often conflicting) observations. These 
findings reflect the individual and organizational views and experiences of the respondents as 
they relate to the specific BECCR initiative as well as other efforts to develop technology 
transfer and commercialization partnerships in Saskatoon cluster. At one level there appears to 
be a clear distinction between perceptions and experiences of those involved with technology 
commercialization from within the university and those who are in other public sector 
organizations within the cluster. More divergence in views is also found within the university as 
compared to between the other public sector organizations.  
Broadly speaking, individuals were rather cautious and a bit sceptical about the prospects 
of the BECCR initiative. The majority of the interviewees displayed negative views about the 
concept and were highly sceptical that it could work. One view held by some individuals was 
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that the idea of pooling patents in the cluster was premature; the individual organizations were 
either not advanced enough to enter a collaborative venture of this scale or were not willing to 
relinquish their IP portfolio to a third party. Others more broadly viewed the idea was `naive` 
and too simplistic for the complex world of agriculture biotechnologies and innovation in 
general. Furthermore, some believed that an entity like BECCR would introduce yet another 
layer of bureaucracy to a system which is already fraught with bureaucratic complexities. 
Altogether, the general opinion across the board seems pessimistic and sceptical towards this 
initiative.  
The observations presented here can be mapped onto the institutional and behavioural 
frameworks presented in the previous chapters. In order to do that, the themes are re-packaged 
into the narrower themes of institutional and behavioural factors as they affected the BECCR 
initiative. While some of the factors may not fit neatly within the institutional and behavioural 
frameworks, nevertheless they can extend understanding of technology transfer partnerships and 
possibly create venues for modifications to the framework in the future.  
Size of the economy and receptor capacity, federal and provincial politics, rules and 
formalization, time frame, faculty involvement, IP policies, ILO structure, University policies 
and administration, organizational culture, and leadership are the sub-themes identified here 
which can be grouped under the IAD umbrella. Findings categorized under framing and the win-
loss mindset, motivations, entrepreneurial spirit, general perceptions, and definition of goals and 
their interpretations can be re-grouped under a comprehensive category called behavioural 
factors. Analyzing these factors extends understanding of how different cognitive models 
influenced decision making within the cluster.  
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A closer look at the sub-themes identified in the previous section reveals that these themes 
directly or indirectly correspond to the main features of the institutional analysis framework 
presented in chapter two and can be analyzed as such. Economy size and receptor capacity, 
leadership, and the governments’ role can be classified as the enabling biophysical material 
conditions, whereas trust and relationships, organizational cultures, university policies and 
administration, ILO structures, and time frames can be considered part of the community 
attributes. Rules and formalization can be used to inform the ‘rules’ component of the 
institutional framework. As chapter two highlighted, biophysical and material conditions, 
attributes of the community, and rules are the exogenous variables which determine the 
interactions between the participants and the action arena. In the analysis section, we analyze 
these findings from the IAD and behavioural perspectives in greater depth.  
5.3.1. Institutional Factors 
Federal and Provincial Politics:  Some respondents, especially the project leaders, were 
sceptical of the role played by the federal and provincial governments in promoting technology 
transfer and commercialization partnerships. In the case of BECCR, project leaders argued that 
while governments were slightly interested in the idea they never really took the responsibility to 
follow up on it. The political will and leadership to support the initiative whole heartedly were 
absent.  
Size of the economy and receptor capacity:  It was noted in the literature and some studies 
that the small size of Saskatchewan’s economy and a lack of receptor capacity in the private 
sector could be contributing factors towards the sub-par performance of technology transfer 
partnerships in the province. However, this factor was notably much smaller and did not feature 
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prominently in the interviews and discussions. As a matter of fact, some respondents even argued 
that Saskatchewan has the necessary resources; yet has not been able to utilize the resources to 
translate innovative activity for its economic progress. 
Rules and Formalization:  Opinions on the impact of institutional factors on the success or 
failure of technology transfer and commercialization partnerships were mixed. It was generally 
asserted that the BECCR did not proceed to the level where it could be institutionalized because 
it failed to secure NCE funding. Consequently, there were no attempts to institutionalize it 
beyond the proposal development stage. To the extent that the proposal and underlying 
negotiations represented an attempt to institutionalize commercialization of technologies from 
within the cluster, many respondents felt that these attempts were insufficient. 
One commonly held view was that the initiative tried to adopt a ‘revolutionary’ approach 
rather than an ‘evolutionary’ approach. The initiative tried to define a broad set of areas for 
collaboration and consequently ended up being too abstract. By trying to encompass a broad set 
of technologies including crops, microbes, animals, and nutrition all in one package, the 
initiative failed to focus on one core area which could have provided the impetus for expansion 
at later stages. The initiative did not reach a level of specificity which would give players the 
certainty that is required for such partnerships. In other words, the BECCR initiative did not 
define the ‘scope’ of its activities.  
Furthermore, it was argued that the suggested membership for the project was too broad. 
Respondents suggested that inclusion of too many organizational players with diverse interests 
may have complicated the negotiations over the roles of each proposed participants. The 
respondents were of the view that in order for such partnerships to be successful, they need to be 
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‘evolutionary’ rather than ‘revolutionary’ and start by taking small pieces and building on them 
instead of adopting a comprehensive approach. According to the respondents, lack of specificity 
along with absence of high level vision and clear definition of end goals were the key 
institutional factors which created impediments for BECCR initiative.  
Generally, the respondents did not view formalizing the institution as an extremely 
important step in the early stages of the partnership development process. Even those who 
considered institutional factors an important part in developing commercialization partnerships 
tended to argue that institutional factors rank behind developing trustworthy and long-term 
relationships among the stakeholders. Nevertheless, they pointed to some successful cases in the 
Saskatoon cluster where institutionalizing the partnerships have helped these partnerships 
develop and grow over the years. Two successful models that were frequently referred to by the 
respondents were the NRC-PBI research collaboration model and the U of S Crop Development 
Center (CDC) partnership with the Saskatchewan Pulse Growers (SPG). In both these cases, 
clear rules of engagement have been established and enforced. The scope of those ventures is 
clearly defined, financial arrangements and revenue sharing schema clearly drawn, and training 
provided to the participants around their protocols for engagement. In addition, these models set 
out rules for information sharing and membership, as well as a very specific set of technologies 
that are to be commercialized. In both cases, however, the scope was narrow and the number of 
participants limited to those with clear interests in the specific partnership. 
Organizational Cultures:  All the respondents agreed that different organizational cultures 
were a definite barrier in developing the technology transfer partnership. The widely held view 
across all the organizations is that indeed the organizational cultures of the university, the public 
sector and private firms differ significantly. Each organization has a different set of values, 
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organizational goals, and expectations. These differences become more problematic when the 
partners fail to understand, or even worse when they do not even attempt to understand, the 
culture(s) in other organizations. Respondents also spoke to the different (institutional) 
‘languages’ as a barrier. This difference in languages makes it difficult for the partnering 
organizations to effectively communicate. Consequently, the three organizational spheres fail to 
understand and respect the requirements and constraints of each other. The lack of understanding 
of each other’s organizational culture can often times lead to misperceptions and a sense of 
competition between the partners, which can contribute to failure of the partnership initiative. In 
the BECCR case, respondents noted that one reason they were sceptical about the idea was they 
feared that organizational difference could not be easily overcome.  
Leadership:  One of the many observations respondents made regarding the failure of BECCR 
and similar initiatives was the lack of effective leadership within the cluster. It was argued that 
no one emerged as a legitimate leader despite many individuals expressing willingness to lead. 
One of the reasons for the lack of leadership was the internal competition across the public sector 
organizations where everyone was more concerned about their own organizational domain and 
issues that fell under that domain. For example, respondents from the public sector organizations 
like NRC-PBI and AAFC believed that they were most suitable leaders whereas the university 
was looked upon as more of a secondary actor. When the university actors failed to secure the 
federal funding, which was considered the main motivation, the so-called ‘champions’ moved 
away from the project. In addition, some argued that the university itself was going through 
administration renewal—searches were underway for vice president research and associate vice 
president research, there was an acting dean for the college of agriculture and a decanal search 
and a new provost had just been appointed—which stifled the momentum of the BECCR project. 
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These major changes at the administrative level caused a lot of uncertainty and those who were 
at the helm of developing the proposal no longer remained associated with the initiative. 
Meanwhile, there were no engaged industrial actors. Consequently, all three spheres failed to 
find committed leaders who could find legitimacy within the cluster. 
Time frame:  A few respondents noted that the effort to create the BECCR was running against 
the clock. Prospective partners felt that there was not enough time to establish a formal entity 
like BECCR given the complexities of issues and the authority chains involved. The 
stakeholders, it was argued, did not get enough time to discuss what each would be able to bring 
to the table. As an afterthought, one respondent claimed that given more time, the project could 
have been successful despite being unable to secure the funding opportunity. 
University policies and administration:  The University culture, many argued, still reflects 
a public-knowledge mentality, which does not easily accept the involvement of private sector on 
the campus. University policies and attitudes of senior administration were considered one of the 
biggest barriers in establishing a three-pillar partnership between academia, public research labs 
and the private sector. One of the biggest barriers was arguably the bureaucratic hurdles at the 
university. Lack of flexibility and speed, respect for other organizational partners, and a failure 
to understand the needs of the partners were identified as the key barriers created by the 
university. It was further suggested that the university does not understand the entrepreneurial 
and innovation culture; it is very conservative, inward looking, and protective of its technologies.  
One concern raised about university commercialization plans is that it is commonly viewed 
as a potential major source of revenues. Many respondents argued that such a view is extremely 
narrow. At the same time the university also has contradictory policies around tenure track, 
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consultation time, and private sector research funding. For example, one faculty member 
interviewed noted that the university collective agreement only allows twelve days of consulting 
work per year. Any extra time devoted towards consulting leads to a claw back in the salaries, 
which acts as a disincentive for many university researchers who are involved in or would like to 
be involved in technology transfer and commercialization activities. On a more general level, 
most respondents argued that these problems are not just confined to University of 
Saskatchewan; rather they are found at a more systemic level across most Canadian universities 
and even in the public labs. 
Industry Liaison Office (ILO) structure:  Some respondents pointed to the ILO structure and 
hiring practices as a core part of the problem. With the BECCR initiative, it was noted that the 
ILO was not involved in starting it and remained largely disengaged from the process. One 
interpretation was that ILO was very sceptical of the idea behind BECCR as it would probably 
lead to it losing substantial control over its IP portfolio.  
During the interviews, individuals commonly referred to the ILO’s hiring practices as 
‘misaligned.’ Respondents argued that ILO has a history of hiring accountants and lawyers to 
manage the IP portfolios and then puts them in-charge of negotiating with other public and 
private sector actors. These individuals were viewed as not well versed with the scientific 
content of innovative technologies, with the result that some felt they might not be able to make 
the right decisions about a technology’s scientific and commercial value.  
Faculty Involvement:  When asked whether faculty/researcher involvement in the 
commercialization process in any way facilitates the partnership development process, the 
responses were mixed. Some argued that faculty involvement in the actual process is not 
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necessary; the role of the researcher is simply to develop new technologies, products and 
services. These individuals argued that researchers are not really and should not be the drivers of 
the commercialization process. One respondent suggested that researchers only care about their 
funding and are not really concerned about the outcomes of technology transfer and 
commercialization. A number of respondents noted that most researchers at universities and 
public laboratories are not professional inventors: they lack a market sense as well as the 
networking capacity to work with the private sector.  
Others respondents, however, viewed researcher involvement as vital. These respondents 
argued that researchers possess tacit knowledge which can be extremely valuable during early 
commercialization, especially at the prototype development stage. One of the respondents 
pointed to the NRC-PBI model, which allows firms to co-locate with researchers during the early 
phases of a transfer partnership. It was observed that many firms (such as those engaged with 
NRC-PBI) were keen on working closely with public sector researchers and were willing to pay 
a premium for the services of those researchers. Respondents who viewed faculty involvement as 
an important factor in the development of technology transfer partnerships noted that 
researchers, especially university researchers, are often encumbered with burdensome university 
regulations which make it almost impossible for these researchers to participate effectively in 
any such activity. As a result, these researchers often end up bypassing the ILO and relevant 
authorities and tend to deal directly with the private sector.  
5.3.2. Behavioural Factors 
Goals and their interpretations:   The interviews revealed that individuals had different goals 
in mind for the BECCR initiative. The interpretation of these goals as well as the means to 
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achieve them also varied significantly across the respondent pool. Some of the more consistent 
observations about the goals of the BECCR included: establishing a central commercialization 
mechanism, promoting economic development, achieving a critical mass, and enhancing 
efficiency. University administration and the project leaders mostly viewed BECCR as a 
platform which would provide a common base to commercialize bio-science innovations and 
enable the stakeholders to develop, nurture, set priorities, make decisions, and mobilize funds 
and resources in support of commercialized technologies. While that intermediate goal may have 
been generally accepted, the ultimate payback was less clear. As one individual highlighted, the 
objective was not to create patents and generate royalties for the university; rather it was to 
attract investment, companies, and research dollars for better graduate training. Given that 
individuals mentioned different goals and payoffs, the only consensus across the group was that 
participants had a lack of agreement over the goals and their interpretations. Participants were of 
the view that the lack of agreement could possibly be attributed to lack of a common vision and 
leadership around this particular initiative.  
Motivations:  While the main intent of the questions was to inquire about the intrinsic 
motivations each of the individual participants held, the responses tended to reflect the 
organizational, extrinsic motivations rather than individual motivations. The majority of the 
participants were of the view that the primary motivation behind the initiative was to tap into the 
funding that had become available through the NCE funding call. Others viewed it as an 
opportunity to secure Saskatchewan’s leadership position in the area of bio-economy and to be 
able to introduce and mobilize innovative technologies into the economy. While on paper these 
could be consistent, in practice they have divergent timelines and beneficiaries. 
  
 
118 
 
Trust and Relationships:  There was almost unanimous consensus that trust and relationships 
were critical to partnership initiatives like BECCR. Establishing a trust-worthy relationship with 
all the potential partners is considered a necessary prerequisite to the development of such 
partnerships. A number of respondents pointed out that the private sector places extremely high 
value on developing relationships with research organizations and that once those relationships 
are established firms are willing to go a long way to maintain those relationships even if they do 
not provide immediate economic returns. It was suggested that trust and relationships should be 
developed and nurtured prior to any attempt to agree upon formal rules of engagement. 
Respondents also agreed that trust and relationships cannot be imposed from outside –they need 
to grow organically. Partners need to be respectful of each other’s organizational culture, while 
communicating to find a common vision. It was argued that in the absence of effective 
communications, misperceptions could arise between partnering organizations which could 
prove detrimental to the long term prospects of establishing a healthy relationship.  
Framing and the Win-Loss mindset:  Given one of the focal points of this study is the 
behavioural models and cognitive limitations of participants in a technology transfer and 
commercialization partnership, this theme features as one of the most important parts of the 
analysis. Questions 4, 8, and the follow-ups to these questions were used as triggers to judge the 
cognitive models potentially employed by the participants.  
The findings suggest that individuals leading the BECCR project were possibly in a 
domain of loss. These individuals suggested that they were 'concerned' about the Saskatoon 
cluster’s position as the leader of innovative technologies. The understanding among these 
individuals was that Saskatchewan had ‘squandered’ its lead. They felt that the cluster was 
‘underperforming’ in terms of moving technologies to commercialization and especially was 
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‘falling behind’ in promoting commercialization of value added technologies. Consequently, 
these individuals tended to see the NCE funding opportunity as an ideal situation to kick-start the 
BECCR project. However, they also pointed out that while they felt a sense of ‘urgency’, they 
were aware that partners from other public sector organizations definitely did not share that sense 
of urgency. 
Respondents who belonged to different public sector organizations tended to convey that 
there was no sense of urgency on their part. They believed that organizations were ‘functioning 
relatively well’ at the individual level, and even though everyone would like to see some 
improvements, the overall cluster is not ‘dysfunctional.’ As a result, there was no overriding 
reason for the organizations to collaborate, apart from the funding opportunity. In short, they 
were risk averse and wanted to see real, tangible benefits before they committed further to the 
partnership. 
Another aspect of these conversations which revealed a risk-averse attitude of the 
partnering organizations was their win-loss mindset. Almost all the respondents noted that there 
was a definite win-loss mindset across the organizations that were involved with this project. 
Respondents generally agreed that all the organizations have a lot riding on whether or not they 
can successfully commercialize their technologies and to hand this function to a third party was a 
risk these players were not willing to take. They were concerned that by doing so they would 
lose their authority, their IP, and the potential revenue streams. The organizations, it was argued, 
had a ‘scarcity mindset,’ which forces them to compete for the limited funding and revenue 
opportunities. One respondent suggested that it was ‘naive’ to imagine a scenario for this 
initiative where the proposed partnering organizations would not compete for the limited 
resources. Some respondents argued that the organizations have not yet advanced to that stage 
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where they are psychologically ready to share resources on anything other than a project-by-
project arrangement. The ‘give-get’ mentality identified by respondents was judged to be a major 
road-block to developing a partnership like BECCR. 
One respondent made an interesting observation: during the time when BECCR was 
undertaken, the university had an acting vice president research, an acting associate vice-
president research, an acting dean and associate dean of agriculture, a soft money researcher, and 
a new provost all involved in one way or another with this venture. All these acting/new 
appointments had limited mandates and it was suggested that they needed a quick or early win to 
solidify their positions. Alternatively, it was suggested that some contingent appointees, 
especially those who think incumbency vests them with more ownership in a position, might be 
in a loss framing and thus be unwilling to undertake a risky initiative, which, if it had gone 
wrong, would jeopardize their credibility. The survey results were not granular enough to enable 
us to define whether the status of the individuals influenced their win-loss framing. 
Entrepreneurial spirit:  The respondents viewed the entrepreneurial spirit and ethos to be a 
very important factor in establishing successful commercialization partnerships. However when 
asked whether researchers need to be entrepreneurial or not, the views were mixed. One view 
was that researchers do not necessarily need to be entrepreneurs as long as someone in the 
partnership has the entrepreneurial skills and is familiar with the intricacies of markets. Others 
viewed it as a difficult proposition for researchers to engage in entrepreneurial activities because 
it is a clash between accountability, control, and entrepreneurialism. These individuals argued 
that entrepreneurs are fundamentally risk takers, whereas the requirements of accountability 
imposed by government and the university act to counter the entrepreneurial spirit. These 
regulations, which allow the administrators to control inputs and outputs, end up negatively 
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affecting the technology transfer and commercialization outcomes one might expect from the 
initiatives such as the BECCR. 
5.4. Analysis  
5.4.1. Institutional Factors 
Attributes of the community seem to have played a decisively negative role in the 
development of BECCR initiative. Different organizational cultures, as hypothesized in the 
previous chapters, have acted as a key impediment in this case. Furthermore, the organizations 
involved in developing these partnerships show no particular interest in understanding and 
respecting each other’s culture. In this regard, rigidness of the university’s organizational culture, 
which has been regarded as ‘unsupportive’ and laden with bureaucratic hurdles, was presented as 
the biggest barrier. Interestingly, similar sceptical perceptions are held by university 
administrators of other public sector organizations and the private sector. Such divergent 
attitudes towards key organizations within a partnership point to a state of disarray within the 
cluster. While all the key players recognize the differences in organizational cultures and stressed 
the need for an understanding and respect of each other’s culture, they were unable to realize that 
goal in the BECCR exercise. Rather, it would appear that extending ‘soft’ co-operation through 
long term communications and relationship building exercises may be the best way to build 
meaningful and effective technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. In this regard, 
longer time frames for development may be critical. Quick, purpose built processes appear to 
have high returns but are not enough to create long-term trust. Repetitive interactions over time, 
some argued, may ultimately enable the participants in these partnerships to develop trust and 
achieve a common understanding of the goals. 
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Biophysical and material conditions, which we define as political leadership and receptor 
capacity, were also not favourable for BECCR. These two factors are complementary, as the 
absence of one could mean absence of the other. For example, if governments are not willing to 
show their positive intent to encourage private sector firms to actively take up innovative 
technologies emerging from the public sector and universities, it sends the wrong signal to the 
private sector. Alternatively, an absence of strong private sector receptor capacity may act as a 
disincentive for governments to take public sector technology transfer and commercialization 
activities seriously. In the case of BECCR both these factors were clearly missing which 
hampered its development and led to its quick demise after the failure to secure NCE funding. 
The other key institutional impediment has been the lack or poor design of rules. Position 
and boundary rules in the case of BECCR were broadly defined, allowing a wide range of 
organizations to act as participants in the proposed partnership. In the case of position rules, 
power structures were not defined in a way which would account for the horizontal nature of the 
project. Consequently, there was a lot of ambiguity over the ownership of the initiative. 
Boundary rules were also defined in a way that would allow the participating organizations to 
remain partners for as long as they wished. In the absence of well-defined boundary rules, the 
leadership for the partnership was ill defined and the initiative subsequently suffered due to the 
lack of ‘champions.’ 
Another important feature was the absence of authority and aggregation rules along with a 
lack of proper communication channels. Failure to devise these rules during the process of 
establishing the partnership constrained the ability of partnering organizations to effectively set 
the direction for the collective venture. The choices of these participants were further limited by 
the key role of patent pooling for the centre. The strong focus on IP and unwillingness on the 
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part of the organizations to transfer the ownership of these patents to a third party organizational 
structure like BECCR proved a strong road block in establishing the partnership.  
The patenting strategies adopted by the partnering organizations also created barriers in 
defining the payoff rules. Lack of agreement on payoff rules was judged to affect the willingness 
of partners to contribute to the partnership and prevented them from wholeheartedly accepting 
the notion of collaboration. As the findings suggest, university policies towards faculty 
involvement in commercializing activities (salary claw-backs and limits on consulting time) have 
also had detrimental effects on the motivations of these individuals to participate in 
commercialization partnerships.  
However, this last finding needs to be carefully qualified. Salary claw-backs and limits on 
consulting times are not directly related to commercialization activities; rather they represent a 
more indirect linkage. At the same time, consulting may be considered by researchers as an 
important step in building relationships with private firms and other partners. Both the literature 
review and the interviews conducted as part of this exercise confirm the importance of long-term 
relationships in the establishment of successful partnerships. Therefore, placing limits on these 
activities may create a disincentive for researchers to reach out to potential partners and hurt the 
efforts of building successful long-term collaborations. 
Another important aspect from these responses was the broad and ambiguous definition of 
the technologies that were to be pooled through the BECCR. The two cases of NRC-PBI and 
CDC-SPG highlighted earlier provide a perfect counterfactual. It can be argued that the broad 
definition of technologies and the diverse array of potential participants made it difficult to 
confine the problem at hand to one action situation. Consequently, there were many overlaps 
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with other action nodes and action arenas, which arguably made it difficult for the project leaders 
to define the rules in a clear and coherent manner. In addition, the levels of analysis were blurred 
because of the poorly defined scope of technologies. The clarity of rules suffered because of their 
embedded status in multiple levels of analysis. In other words, rules at each focal level were 
influenced by rules at other levels. As deduced through the discussion on the IAD framework, 
lack of a clear problem definition quite likely played an important part in blurring the 
relationship between rules and level of analysis, making it difficult for the project leaders to 
analyze the implications of these rules in isolation from their broader application. 
A summary of institutional variables as they were laid out in the case of BECCR and 
partnerships established in the cases of canola and pulses is presented in Table 5.3. This 
comparative table helps us understand the underlying differences in these factors and their 
ultimate impact on the outcomes of these partnerships. It should be noted that the institutional 
factors in the case of canola and pulses partnerships have not been identified through an 
extensive case study like the one conducted for BECCR; rather they emerge from previously 
undertaken studies on the Saskatoon based Ag-biotech cluster. 
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Table 5.3.  Comparison of Commercialization and Technology Transfer Partnership 
initiatives in Saskatoon Cluster 
 BECCR Rapeseed to 
Canola  
HT Canola Pulses 
 
 
Action 
Arena 
Broad definition 
of the problem, 
different 
interpretations of 
goals, different 
cognitive framing 
of the issue at the 
individual level 
Narrow definition 
of the problem; 
common goal of 
producing and 
adopting double-
zero rape 
Sharply focused 
commercial 
problem; 
competition 
between four 
competing research 
efforts 
Broad definition 
of the problem; 
common goals 
of producing 
and adopting 
new pulse 
varieties shared 
globally  
 
 
Attributes 
of the 
Community 
Diverse 
community, 
comprised of 
various public 
sector and 
university 
researchers as 
well as  senior 
administration 
Narrow 
community of 
public sector 
plant scientists 
and chemists, 
supplemented 
with farmer -led 
commodity 
groups and 
supportive supply 
chain 
Corporately 
controlled research 
and 
commercialization, 
supplemented with 
public-private 
research 
partnerships that 
engage star 
scientists 
Diverse 
community of 
public sector 
plant scientists 
and farmer-led 
commodity 
groups 
networked to 
global system 
 
 
Biophysical 
and 
Material 
Conditions 
Absence of 
political support , 
lack of economic 
receptor capacity, 
lack of leadership, 
and pressed for 
time in terms of 
funding 
opportunity, rigid 
IP policies 
State as low-key 
facilitator and 
leader; open 
ended  effort; 
flexible funding 
and open IP 
policies  
Commercial 
systems focused on 
exploiting 
Canadian and 
global markets; 
proprietary 
systems; 
commercial 
funding and rigid 
IP structures 
Blend of public 
and proprietary 
research and 
commercializati
on; large and 
diversely  
connected 
community of 
funders, 
researchers and 
marketers  
 
 
 
Rules 
Vaguely defined, 
broad definition 
of membership 
and technologies 
to be 
commercialized, 
lack of agreement 
on payoff and 
scope rules 
Relied upon 
open-science 
norms that were 
communally 
developed and 
sustained; vague 
yet effective 
payoff and scope 
rules 
Clearly defined 
payoff and scope 
rules embedded in 
firms, 
supplemented by 
contracts to access 
and advance public 
science  
Public-private 
partnerships 
with 
contractually 
managed payoff 
and scope rules; 
general reliance 
on commercial 
research payoffs 
combined with 
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upon open-
science norms  
 
Outcomes Unsuccessful; 
effort aborted 
after two years 
Successful 
development and 
widespread 
adoption of 
canola in 1960-78 
period; growth in 
industry to largest 
crop in 
succeeding years 
Successful 
development and 
widespread 
adoption of HT 
canola in 1985-
1999; 30% growth 
in acreage in 
succeeding years 
Successful 
development 
and adoption of 
a succession of 
new pulse 
varieties and 
growth in 
industry to more 
than 5 million 
acres 1995-2011 
Source:  Author. Phillips and 
Khachatourians 
2001 
Phillips 2001; 
Phillips 2002 
Boland, Ryan 
and Phillips 
2011 
 
5.4.2. Behavioural Factors 
Problem framing and differences in cognitive domains of individuals seem to have played 
an important role in sealing the fate of the BECCR initiative. The most important difference 
identified was between the university and other public sector organizations. Even within the 
university, there were considerable differences in the cognitive domains held by the project 
leaders and senior university administrators. It can be argued that the university as a whole and 
the project leaders especially viewed the initiative from a loss domain perspective. Their view of 
the cluster’s losing leadership position (‘squandering the lead’) was the primary driving 
motivation behind the initiative. Furthermore, the perception among the BECCR participants that 
the ILO has had little success in commercializing technologies appears to have played a role in 
placing the university participants in the initiative in a domain of loss.  
Some university administrators, for different reasons, were at times in the domain of gains. 
As pointed out earlier, some senior administrators had recently been appointed to the acting 
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positions, especially the vice president and associate vice president research, who were 
organizationally responsible for representing the interests of the university in this partnership. 
Because of their contingent status and expectations of securing long appointment, these 
individuals appear to have been largely in the domain of gains. Consequently, they were less 
willing to take risks that might jeopardize their positions. Eventually, these individuals secured 
long term permanent appointments--had the project lasted until these individuals were able to 
establish themselves in their respective positions, one might expect them to take much bolder 
risk-taking steps.  
The individuals representing other public sector organizations, however, did not view the 
cluster as threatened. These organizations tended to report that they were performing relatively 
better than the university in their technology transfer and commercialization functions—thus 
they framed the problem from a domain of gains perspective.  
Similarly, it can be argued that many researchers were and often are in a domain of gains, 
especially after a successful scientific discovery. Their cognitive framing is often demonstrated 
through their high valuation of their inventions despite evidence that the real commercial value 
of any single invention is usually modest. As a result, many inventors are less willing to take 
risks by exposing their technologies to under developed markets. This negatively impacts their 
capacity to understand the market risks (they become averse to these risks), resulting in a lack of 
willingness to participate in commercialization activities. 
A faculty member’s cognitive framing can be used to explain the lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit in the science-based world. While it has been argued that these individuals are usually 
creative and entrepreneurial in their own fields of study, they do not exhibit a good 
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understanding of market dynamics and entrepreneurial spirit. As argued in the previous chapter, 
market entrepreneurialism requires individuals to make risky decisions which ultimately rest on 
the cognitive framing of possibilities in the loss category. Since the faculty members and other 
public organizations most often appear to be in the domain of gains, their propensity to be risk-
seeking declines significantly. 
Table 5.4.  Key descriptors and cognitive domains of individuals in BECCR 
Position Key Descriptors Cognitive Domain 
Project Leaders Viewed the cluster as ‘underperforming’; 
concerned about “squandering the lead” 
Loss 
University Administrators New administrative appointments less 
willing to undertake risky initiatives 
Gain 
Public Sector Researchers and 
Administrators 
Organizations were viewed as 
‘functioning relatively well’; cluster was 
viewed as ‘not dysfunctional’ 
Gain 
University Researchers New discoveries/innovations; 
Lack of market entrepreneurialism 
Gain 
Source: Author. 
The broad definition of membership in the BECCR initiative could also have adversely 
impacted the cognitive domains of individuals. Individuals who were to join the initiative came 
from different academic and professional backgrounds. It can be argued that differences in norms 
across various academic disciplines shape the cognitive processes employed by individuals. For 
example, those trained in sciences use more deductive approaches in their decision-making 
whereas those from social sciences take inductive approaches—the BECCR involved scholars 
and practitioners from both fields. These differences in decision making approaches could also 
have an impact on individual’s cognitive framing of a situation. While this cannot be confirmed 
in the surveys, the possibility remains. 
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The broad and expansive definition of technologies in the BECCR initiative may also have 
affected the decision-making processes of individuals. Since the project had envisioned including 
a broad and somewhat ill defined set of technologies, one can imagine that individuals associated 
with different technologies and products may be in different domains. Those working on pulses, 
for example, might be in a domain of gain as the CDC-SPG partnership was judged to be serving 
them well. Those who identified themselves with bio-fuel technologies, in contrast, might be in a 
domain of loss; efforts to develop bio-fuels are still in their infancy and have not met with much 
success. Consequently, one can expect researchers from the former group to have viewed the 
BECCR initiative as a risky prospect, with returns that would not be significant enough to offset 
their existing returns, while the latter group might be more disposed to engaging.  
The differences in framing of the issue may also have negatively impacted the mindset of 
individuals involved in the partnership. Those who viewed themselves or their organizations as 
generally successful might be in a position of gains and be more concerned about the possible 
loss of their position or the loss of revenues which would accompany the transfer of their IP 
portfolio to BECCR. The survey confirmed that many of these individuals, and the organizations 
they represented, were sceptical of the idea behind BECCR, reflecting their risk-aversion.  
Differences in cognitive framing can also be used to explain the divergence in the goals 
and interpretation of those goals by the participants. Individuals in a domain of gains appeared to 
envision the partnership as a mode to establish long-term trustworthy relationships with each 
other. Those in the loss domain viewed the partnership as a source of economic development 
accompanied by a healthy long-term revenue source for the university and possibly other 
partnering organizations in the cluster. These divergent views, along with lack of communication 
channels, and other factors described previously, contributed to the failure of the project. 
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5.5. Conclusions 
While Canada has strong research capacity, it remains behind many developed countries in 
its ability to transfer and commercialize technology. While many technology clusters exist in 
Canada, their contributions to the economy have generally remained below par. Saskatoon’s 
agriculture biotechnology and bio-economy cluster has had some success. Despite the strong 
presence of many public and private sector organizations, including the University of 
Saskatchewan, there remains a significant gap between basic research and commercialization. 
There have been many attempts over the last decade to improve this deficiency; however most of 
these attempts have been less than successful. The BECCR effort, presented in detail here, 
sought to develop a bio-economy center of commercialization and research. Through this 
attempt, the university and public sector organizations attempted to develop a common pool of 
commercially viable technology patents. The idea was to develop a central vehicle to 
commercialize the technologies generated in the community, by packaging them together. It was 
hoped that such an organization would provide an overarching system which would be more 
efficient and would attract more private sector uptake of these technologies. The project failed, 
likely for a variety of reasons. Most point to the failure to secure funding as the point of failure—
while that clearly was a milestone in the effort, it in and of itself did not have to signal complete 
failure. In this chapter, we have attempted to present some of the underlying reasons which acted 
as impediment to the sustained development of the initiative. 
The case study on the BECCR project, developed by conducting exploratory interviews, 
has provided insights into a range of institutional and behavioural factors. The analysis shows 
that the critical institutional factors were the exogenous variables (biophysical and material 
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conditions, community attributes, and rules) and the ill defined action arena. Within each of 
these categories, many sub-themes were identified which helped us to parse out the institutional 
details as they played out in the process.  
The case study also offers an analysis of the behavioural factors which appear to have 
played a role in the process of establishing the commercialization partnership. The differences in 
cognitive framing of the problem have been identified as a main impediment in the development 
of this particular partnership. These differences appear to have led to a competition based on the 
win-loss mindset and caused a divergence in the understanding of goals and their interpretations. 
While this element has not been methodologically sophisticated, the brief analysis provides 
critical insight into the impediments that can be created because of different cognitive models 
employed in the formation of partnerships.  
  
 
132 
 
Six 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
This study has presented an institutional and behavioural framework for the analysis of 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. Based on the literature review and the 
theoretical framework presented in chapters three and four, a case study has been developed to 
analyze a specific partnership development effort in the Saskatoon cluster. This chapter offers a 
summary of the theoretical and empirical observations and presents the reader with some policy 
lessons for future efforts to develop technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. The 
chapter concludes with an assessment of the limitations of the study and potential extensions for 
further research. 
6.1.  Key findings 
The overarching goal of this study was to develop an institutional and behavioural model 
for technology transfer and commercialization partnerships and to test these theoretical 
postulates using a case study. The study began with an examination of the existing literature on 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships.  
The literature analysis offered an understanding of the basic conceptions of such 
partnerships and highlighted some of the shortcomings of previous studies. The primary 
limitation observed in past studies was that they failed to provide a comprehensive account of the 
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underlying factors affecting partnerships. Those studies took a very contextual approach in 
highlighting the pre-requisites for establishing technology transfer partnerships as well as the 
impediments faced by these partnerships. Underlying and complicating this is that there was a 
lack of a ‘common language’ to describe the functioning of partnerships. Moreover, past studies 
did not account for the cognitive limitations of the individuals within these partnerships. 
Consequently, they ended up overlooking key interaction and decision making patterns.  
In order to remedy those problems, we have undertaken a comprehensive theoretical 
review and developed an analytical framework which provides tools to conduct institutional and 
behavioural analysis of technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. The institutional 
framework has been built on Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework and makes use of behavioural 
decision making theories developed by Herbert Simon (1950) and Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky (1979).  
The IAD framework, developed to deal with common pool situations, provides a set of 
tools which are flexible enough to be adapted to partnership settings. The framework has allowed 
us to develop a comprehensive language that can be applied to many similar situations. Using 
this framework, we have been able to highlight critical institutional factors which can either 
facilitate or hamper the development of technology transfer partnerships. The key exogenous 
variables which play an important role in these partnerships include: attributes of the community, 
biophysical and material conditions, and rules. These variables determine the playing field for 
participants in partnerships to interact, make decisions, and influence the outcomes. We have 
argued that rules, both formal and informal, are a critical factor in determining the efficiency and 
effectiveness of partnerships because they not only affect the action arena, but also evolve over 
time due to interactions between participants. Therefore, feedback effects in these partnerships 
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can alter the long term functioning of their operations. Various sets of rules affect the partnership 
structure and the interactions within it. Rules determining position, boundary, authority, choice, 
aggregation, information, payoff, and scope are critical in determining various decision-making 
nodes in the action situation. These rules combined together determine how participants in these 
partnerships interact and ultimately influence the outcomes.  
The focus of analysis, as highlighted previously, also determines the understanding of the 
entire system. Depending on the level of analysis, one can study how rules affect the interactions 
at the operational, constitutional, and meta-constitutional levels. It is important to distinguish 
between these levels, as each level determines the complexity of the action arena and can make it 
difficult for participants to make decisions under nested action situations. In technology transfer 
partnerships, which are comprised of organizational actors from academia, public, and private 
sectors, a complex nesting is always likely to emerge, which can and often does blur the level of 
analysis.  
In addition to the institutional factors, individual behaviours have a strong influence on the 
interactions and outcomes in a technology transfer partnership. In chapter four, we argued that 
individuals in complex settings cannot be expected to act perfectly rationally as posited by the 
traditional rational choice school. Even if and when they do have access to complete information 
(which is almost an impossible task to achieve in the case of multi-player technology transfer 
partnerships), they employ different cognitive models to process that information. . 
Consequently, they end up choosing the option that satisfies their minimum aspiration level. In 
such situations, individuals may be making decisions that do not satisfy the criteria of 
comprehensive rationality; however they are not aware of this because of the environmental as 
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well as cognitive constraints. This line of argument represents ‘bounded rationality,’ as put 
forward by Simon (1955).  
Another cognitive factor that affects the decisions of individuals in such partnerships is the 
perceptive framing of problems. It has been argued that individuals perceive and evaluate similar 
situations differently depending on their framing. If individuals perceive themselves in a domain 
of gain, they tend to be more risk averse and vice versa. Furthermore, individuals constantly 
employ various heuristics and biases, which are governed by underlying cognitive systems. 
These frames, heuristics and biases all influence the decisions being made within collaborative 
settings. Taken together, risk framing and use of heuristics and biases comprise the theoretical 
postulates of Prospect Theory (Khaneman and Tversky 1979).  
We have argued in this thesis that these cognitive limitations determine the interaction 
patterns between participants in technology transfer partnerships. The IAD framework thus 
provides an ideal setting to account for the impact of cognitive capacities on information 
processing and the extrinsic and intrinsic valuations participants place on different alternatives. 
In complex situations similar to technology transfer and commercialization partnerships, 
cognitive limitations can become critical factors in determining the outcomes.  
In order to test these theoretical postulates, we developed a case study on the Saskatoon 
agriculture biotechnology cluster. Through this study, we explored several of these factors as 
they might have affected the development in 2006-2008 of the Bio-economy Center of 
Commercialization and Research (BECCR). Individuals from different organizations were 
interviewed to determine their experiences regarding this particular initiative. The key findings 
from this case study were then grouped and analysed in the context of the institutional and 
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behavioural frameworks (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). The surveys reflect an interesting spectrum of 
diverging opinions and experiences. 
Table 6.1. Classification of Institutional Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Factors  
Rules Rules and Formalization 
 
Biophysical and 
Material Conditions 
Size of Economy and Receptor Capacity  
Leadership  
Time Frames  
Federal and Provincial Politics 
 
Attributes of the 
Community 
Organizational Cultures  
University Policies and Administration  
ILO Structures & IP Policies  
Trust and Relationships 
Source: Author. 
Table 6.2. Classification of Behavioural Factors 
 
 
Behavioural Factors 
General perceptions  
Framing and the win-loss mindset  
Motivations  
Entrepreneurial spirit  
Definition of goals and their interpretations 
Source: Author. 
The survey findings suggest that from an institutional point of view, community attributes 
and behavioural factors have exerted a negative influence on the partnership development efforts 
in the Saskatoon cluster. Participants suggested that developing a long term relationship and trust 
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was more crucial at the beginning of the process than agreeing on a set of rules. However, as 
highlighted in chapter five, it was the absence or poor design of various rules that might have 
played negatively on other institutional variables in the partnership. For example, the scope 
included a broadly and loosely defined set of technologies, which constrained the ability of 
organizations to focus on one analytical level and judge the commercial viability of a smaller set 
of technologies. Furthermore, authority and aggregation rules were found to be absent in this 
particular initiative, which created leadership problems. Absence of these subsets of rules 
hampered the attempts to achieve synchronization by developing a common language and 
agreeing to a mutually beneficial outcome. 
Similarly, differences in perceptive framing of the problem had led the participants to 
assign different values to the proposition. University administrators, many of the public research 
labs, and most researchers were thought to be in the domain of gains, whereas key project leaders 
viewed the cluster in a losing position. Other organizations, due to their relatively better 
performance in the area of technology transfer and commercialization, were also in a domain of 
gains. These differences in perceptions caused a divergence in participants’ goals and 
motivations. More importantly, these differences led the organizations to hold unfavourable 
perceptions about their prospective partners, eventually falling prey to the win-loss mindset. 
 6.2. Limitations of the study 
The framework developed here paints the bigger picture with rather broad strokes. 
However, each of the variables (exogenous and endogenous) in the framework has the potential 
to be examined in more detail to gain further insights into the effects of the institutional factors 
on other variables. For example, the effect of these variables on the outcomes has not been 
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studied here. Therefore, applying the framework in a more intensive and focused way would be 
an ideal extension to the study. 
It may be argued by some that frameworks such as the IAD are too complicated and 
complex to extend an understanding of technology transfer and innovation systems. While there 
may be some substance to these criticisms, we propose the following two arguments as a counter 
to these critiques. Firstly, the IAD framework provides the flexibility to the analyst to choose the 
level of analysis and allows for modifications in the layout of all or some variables within the 
institutional structure under study. Secondly, it must be noted that innovation systems and their 
sub-systems are dynamic and complex systems. To understand these systems a framework 
should be able to account for the dynamic and simultaneous transformations. The IAD provides 
such dynamism. While this feature of IAD was not fully utilized in this work as we did not delve 
into the constitutional and meta-constitutional levels of analysis, such dynamism can definitely 
be advantageous in the study of innovation systems. 
 One caveat regarding the BECCR initiative should also be noted. It can be argued that the 
idea of BECCR was closely linked with the funding opportunity. While the respondents have 
rightly pointed towards other institutional and behavioural factors which might have generated 
and then hindered the development, it must be realized that the entire project was predicated 
upon securing NCE funding. In the absence of funding, the remaining institutional and 
behavioural factors had diminished significance. 
In terms of methodology, these respondents were identified using the snowball technique, 
which may have missed some critical yet unacknowledged actors. Moreover, the open-ended 
survey instrument did not provide a set of methodologically sophisticated observations nor are 
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they analyzed using intensive qualitative techniques. All of the semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in a back and forth conversational style, where the interviewer (author) asked the 
participants open-ended questions to which the participants mostly reflected on through their 
individual experiences. While these interviews allowed us to learn a great deal about the cluster 
as a whole, it was difficult to scientifically make inferences from the responses. A more focused, 
methodologically sophisticated survey might provide more consistent observations regarding the 
functioning of specific aspects of this venture. Creating an index of responses and conducting 
correlation analysis are a few techniques which might render stronger, more empirically-
grounded results. 
Furthermore, the questions designed to test behavioural assumptions yielded weak 
observations. Testing of cognitive framing and other behavioural models can and should involve 
formal experiments in controlled environments, as have been conducted by many behavioural 
theorists. Even in the case of controlled experiments, getting the participants in such partnerships 
to reveal their cognitive framing and their relative domains might be a difficult challenge.  
Another consideration is that participants were asked to share their past experiences with 
the particular partnership initiative. It can be argued that such retrospective reflections may have 
biased participants’ responses. A better option might be to observe the participants during their 
decision making. However, that might not be possible in reality: to observe decisions first hand 
is not feasible due to time constraints, confidentiality issues and many hurdles that are faced in 
real-life situations. 
Finally, while we have presented a comprehensive theoretical framework to undertake 
institutional and behavioural analysis, time and scope constraints did not allow us to test these 
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theories using a larger population of partnerships. The efforts to develop technology transfer 
partnerships in the Saskatoon cluster could be compared and contrasted with initiatives 
elsewhere in North America and Europe.  
6.3. Implications and Extensions of Research 
The study provides a platform for policy analysts and practitioners to study and analyze the 
development and management of technology transfer partnerships. It has focused on some key 
institutional factors that are deeply embedded at different organizational levels and may relate to 
partners and their engagement.  
The findings presented in this study have highlighted key areas which could benefit from 
policy and administrative reforms. Each organization in the cluster can take a message from this 
analysis as it applies to their institutional setup. The public sector, for example, can look at their 
existing initiatives from the perspective of the framework presented in this study and analyze the 
shortcomings in their policies. Such a policy evaluation could ensure better outcomes which can 
be explained in terms of institutional and behavioural interactions. Therefore, this study can be 
thought of as one type of feedback to participants in the partnerships.  
The study also allows policy makers to assess the biophysical and material conditions and 
the attributes of various ‘communities’ involved in partnerships. An understanding of these two 
necessary conditions would help policy makers devise comprehensive ‘rules’ of engagement and 
decision-making and help them understand the interactions between individuals in complex 
settings. As we have highlighted, technology transfer and commercialization partnerships, like 
many other situations in the world, are extremely complex. The framework presented in this 
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study allows the policy makers and analysts to parse out the relevant action nodes within such 
partnerships from the underlying organizational structures which enshrine these nodes.  
 The study has highlighted some key factors which may hinder the development of 
technology transfer and commercialization partnerships. It therefore gives policy makers a 
chance to carefully analyze these factors and ensure that effective policies are enacted to remove 
them from the system. At the most fundamental level the study highlights the role of the 
government in promoting such technology transfer and commercialization partnerships by 
providing the feasible conditions which can allow these partnerships to emerge and flourish.  
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3. Context and Abstract  
Even with so much attention being given to innovation and technology production and transfer, 
much of the effort has not been efficient in generating economic growth through technology 
commercialization. In Saskatchewan, a few attempts have been made to effectively pool the 
technologies and disseminate them into the mainstream economy. However, these attempts have 
not succeeded. Studies related to such research partnerships have not fully explained the reasons 
behind these failures. This work establishes a framework which will capture the intricacies of 
technology production and transfer across institutional borders. 
 
This study falls under one of the activities of VALGEN project, dealing with knowledge 
management. It will specifically look at one of the components of knowledge transfer in the form 
of technology transfer between various organizations (covered under A2 in the VALGEN 
project). This research is investigating the efforts, roles and outcomes of the University of 
Saskatchewan led initiative to create the Bio-Economy Center of Commercialization and 
Research (BECCR), in an attempt to manage the patent and IP pool of agri-food related 
technologies in Saskatchewan. This effort in 2005-09 was led by B. Laarvald and S. Smyth of 
University of Saskatchewan and involved discussions and negotiations with NRC, AAFC, SRC, 
AWB and various others in the Saskatoon-based agri-food cluster. 
 
 The purpose of this study is to develop an institutional and behavioural analysis of public-
private partnerships in order to promote effective technology transfer and commercialization. In 
terms of institutional analysis, a framework will be developed to account for the effects of 
exogenous variables such as rules, attributes of the community, and biophysical conditions. The 
framework will facilitate analysis of the problem in a given frame, and unpack how various 
participants addressed the problem. The study will also undertake a quasi-behavioural analysis in 
order to find out about how individual motivations, perceptions, and cognitive framing might 
exert a feedback effect on the problem and exogenous variables as well as the outcomes.  
 
This specific ethics request is to conduct interviews with those individuals involved in initiating 
such efforts at the University of Saskatchewan as well as other related organizations.  
 
 4. Funding   
 VALGEN 
5. Participants   
The participants in this case study will be selected on the basis of their involvement with the 
specific partnership. These include department heads, project leads, and senior management 
officials of various organizations. The shortlist of those to be interviewed involves 8-10 
individuals from those organizations who were involved in the partnership development process 
at some stage. The list may be expanded further if leads are generated during the 
research/interview process. These are the individuals who are experts in their respective areas 
and are sophisticated respondents. In all cases, the individuals will be authoritative. Most of the 
individuals have been contacted and they have expressed willingness and interest in 
participating. The formal enrolment letter is attached. 
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6.   Conflict of Interest   
No conflict of interest situation can be foreseen to be arising in this study. 
7.   Consent   
All researchers are able to drop out of the survey/relationship at any time. Research goals, 
methods, and results will be fully disclosed to all participants. These messages will be conveyed 
in the formal letter of enrolment. 
Once the interviews have been conducted, all individuals will be anonymyzed before the data is 
used for further research purposes.  All identifying codes will be kept confidential. 
9. Methods/Procedures   
In-person and/or telephone interviews will be used to conduct the attached semi-structured 
interview. These questions will be open ended in order to garner a broad description from the 
participants. 
10. Storage of Data   
Permission will be sought from the participants to tape and/or make notes of the interviews, 
which will be kept in the possession of the primary researcher and/or his advisor.  All data will 
be kept in files in the offices of Dr. Phillips. As per University regulations, as the lead researcher 
and supervisor, I commit to securely store the data at the University of Saskatchewan for a 
minimum of five years upon the completion of the study. 
11. Dissemination of Results   
The data collected will be used to inform the case study which is part of a MPP dissertation. The 
responses collected from the interviews will be used to support the theoretical arguments built 
around institutional and behavioural factors affecting the effectiveness of research partnerships 
developed to promote technology transfer and commercialization.  
12. Risk, Benefits, and Deception  
We do not foresee any specific risks.  This is a knowledgeable and professional population that 
will benefit from the research directly.  The purpose of the research is to assess the effects of 
institutional procedures and behavioural factors on the success/failure of technology transfer 
partnerships.   
13.   Confidentiality   
 
Once the interviews have been conducted, all individuals will be anonymyzed.  No results will 
be released that can be used to identify an individual. Only system results and aggregates will be 
reported.  No direct quotations will be used.   
14.  Data/Transcript Release   
N/A. 
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15. Debriefing and feedback  
The results will be part of the thesis which has been undertaken as part of the requirements for 
master of public policy.  These results will be incorporated in the dissertation and presented to 
the thesis committee during thesis defence.  
16. Required Signatures 
